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Abstract
Objectives: To evaluate the relative contribution of illness beliefs, mastery strivings and
emotion regulation processes to the prediction of outcomes in diabetes (diabetes distress,
self care behaviour, and HbAlc scores).
Design and Methods: Ninety six adults with type 1 or type 2 diabetes were assessed on
measures of illness beliefs, mastery strivings, and emotion regulation processes in a cross
sectional design to determine their predictive relationship to diabetes distress, self care
behaviour, and blood sugar levels (the latter was measured at baseline and at 6 months
follow up to allow cross sectional and longitudinal comparisons).
Results: When comparing illness beliefs with emotion regulation processes, illness
beliefs (control; seriousness) and a specific emotion regulation process (rumination)
predicted diabetes distress. Illness beliefs (particularly control and seriousness) partially
mediated the association between emotional rumination and diabetes distress. When
comparing mastery strivings with illness beliefs, diabetes distress was predicted by a
particular mastery striving (perfectionism) and specific illness beliefs (control;
seriousness). Illness beliefs (control and seriousness) mediated the association between
specific mastery variables (Type A and rational coping) and diabetes distress.
In a comparative evaluation ofmastery strivings and illness beliefs as potential predictors
ofselfcare behaviours, rational coping (a mastery striving) predicted general diet in the
final model. Perceived control partially mediated the effect of rational coping on general
diet. None of the mastery striving variables or illness beliefs predicted exercise in the
final model (rational coping, while predictive at step two, dissolved at step three).
Finally, perceived effectiveness of treatment (illness belief) predicted blood monitoring
in the final model. Perceived effectiveness of treatment mediated the effects ofType A
on blood monitoring behaviour.
When comparing self care behaviours with psychophysiological variables in relation to
blood sugar levels, none of the components of either grouping predicted HbAlc scores at
baseline. However, at 6 months follow-up, one specific psychophysiological variable -
emotional inhibition - predicted blood sugar levels. As with baseline HbAlc scores, none
of the self care variables were predictive ofHbAlc scores at follow up.
Conclusion: Illness beliefs possibly mediate the effects ofmore generic personality
characteristics - mastery strivings and emotional regulation processes - on diabetes
outcomes (emotional adjustment, self care behaviour). Moreover, an emotion regulation
process (inhibition) directly mediated changes in blood sugar levels. The therapeutic




I wish to thank members of the local adult diabetes team in Daisy Hill Hospital, Newry,
Co. Down - Dr.Emmet Devlin, Angela Keating, Sally Griffin and Janette Newell - for
their support for this project and their invaluable practical assistance in facilitating patient
participation over a considerable period of time. To the patients who gave of their time, I
am very grateful.
Professor Mike Power (University of Edinburgh) provided encouragement and advice on
methodological aspects of the initial research proposal. 1 am also indebted to Dr.Martin
Dempster (Queens University, Belfast) for his guidance and advice on the statistical
analysis of the data. Thanks is also due to Dr.Matthias Schwannauer (University of
Edinburgh) for his helpful commentary on the research design and the initial draft of this
thesis. Within the clinical psychology department (Daisy Hill Hospital), Dr.Gerry
McDonald kept my morale up with his humour and constant support. In the preparation
of this manuscript, the secretarial support provided by Briege Campbell was much
appreciated.
Finally, the 'write up' phase took me away from family life for lengthy periods. I was
greatly supported in this endeavour by the patience and encouragement from my wife,
Edel. My young children, Shane and Anna also made great allowances for my retreat




Table 1 Patient Characteristics 56
Table 2 Distribution of scores on Psychological, Behavioural
and Physiological measures 57
Table 3 Summary of Correlation Analysis between Dependent
and Independent variables 58
Table 4 Emotional Regulation Processes v Illness Beliefs: Hierarchical
regression analysis to predict square root of diabetes distress
(including mediation analysis) 61
Table 5 Mastery Schemas v Illness Beliefs: Hierarchical regression
analysis to predict square root of diabetes related distress
(including mediation analysis) 63
Table 6.1 Mastery Schemas v Illness Beliefs: Hierarchical regression
analysis to predict self care behaviour (square of diet) 66
Table 6.2 Mastery Schemas v Illness Beliefs: Hierarchical regression
analysis to predict self care behaviour (exercise) 67
Table 6.3 Mastery Schemas v Illness Beliefs: Hierarchical regression
analysis to predict self care behaviour (blood monitoring)
(including mediaton analysis) 69
Table 7.1 Self Care Behaviours v Psychophysiological Variables:
Hierarchical regression analysis to predict HbAlc at Time 1 71
Table 7.2 Self Care Behaviours v Psychophysiological Variables:




Figure 1.1 Histogram: Predictors : Emotion regulation v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Square root of distress (data transformed) 117
Figure 1.2 Scatterplot: Predictors: Emotion regulation v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Square root of distress (data transformed) 118
Figure 2.1 Histogram: Predictors: Emotion regulation v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Distress (before data transformation) 119
Figure 2.2 Scatterplot: Predictors: Emotion regulation v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Distress {before data transformation) 120
Figure 3.1 Histogram: Predictors: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Square root of distress {data transformed)... 121
Figure 3.2 Seatterplot: Predictor s: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Square root of distress {data transformed) 122
Figure 4.1 Histogram: Predictors: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Distress {before data transformation) 123
Figure 4.2 Scatterplot: Predictors: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Distress {before data transformation) 124
Figure 5.1 Histogram: Predictors: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Square of diet {data transformed) 125
Figure 5.2 Scatterplot: Predictors: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Square of diet {data transformed) 126
IV
LIST OF FIGURES (contd.)
Page
Figure 6.1 Histogram: Predictors: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Diet (before data transformation) 127
Figure 6.2 Scatterplot: Predictors: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Diet (before data transformation) 128
Figure 7.1 Histogram: Predictors: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Exercise 129
Figure 7.2 Scatterplot: Predictors: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Exercise 130
Figure 8.1 Histogram: Predictors: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Blood sugar monitoring 131
Figure 8.2 Scatterplot: Predictors: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Blood sugar monitoring 132
Figure 9.1 Histogram: Predictors: Self care v Psychophysiol. factors
Dependent variable: Most recent HbAlc score 133
Figure 9.2 Scatterplot: Predictors: Self care v Psychophysiol. factors
Dependent variable: Most recent HbAlc score 134
Figure 10.1 Histogram: Predictors: Self care v Psychophysiol. factors
Dependent variable: Future HbAlc score 135
Figure 10.2 Scatterplot: Predictors: Self care v Psychophysiol. factors




Diabetes, with its multiple psychological and behavioural demands, can be viewed as
a chronic stressor. As such, it requires certain personal capabilities and resources to
cope with the pressures and strains involved over the longer term. At the heart of
classical models of stress and coping (Lazarus & Folkmann, 1984) are the constructs
of appraisal and coping. The present research is concerned with investigating
appraisal and coping dimensions for their relevance to diabetes adaptation. The
literature review will deal with these core concepts respectively. The review does not
aim to provide an exhaustive coverage of research studies in the areas identified.
Rather, exemplar studies were selected to illustrate, and provide empirical support for,
theoretical perspectives considered relevant to an understanding of psychological
adaptation in diabetes.
1.1 Cognitive Representations of Illness
Within mental health, cognitive models posit an appraisal mediating mechanism
between events and subsequent emotional reactions. In simple terms, the model
proposes that it is not events themselves that give rise to emotional distress but rather
the meaning attached to the event which dictates the emotional response (Beck et
al,1979, 1989). To understand negative emotional reactions, the model proposes a
biased or partisan appraisal system laden with thinking distortions i.e.
misinterpretations, catastrophizing tendencies etc. In extrapolating the model to
illness behaviour, it is conceivable that adaptation to illness may well be mediated by
specific cognitive appraisals. A commonality across cognitive models of
dysfunctional illness behaviour is the notion of individuals as active information
processors constructing an understanding of one's illness. Adopting the concept of
mediation, emotional reactions to illness or, indeed, coping or self-care behaviour
should flow directly from one's personal understanding of one's illness.
Such explanatory models have been applied to diverse illness presentations.
Sharpe (1996), for example, highlights how dysfunctional cognitions in chronic
fatigue conditions can hinder recovery through the promotion of unhelpful self care
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efforts. In health anxiety, the cognitive model gives primacy to the misinterpretation
of commonplace physical sensations e.g. autonomic arousal. (Salkofskis &Warrick,
1986) 'Mental catastrophizing' is posited as central to the severity of the emotional
reaction. That is, a sinister interpretation is placed on a benign symptom which, if
repeatedly activated over time, escalates into obsessive health ruminations/
preoccupations. Experimental evidence affirms this tendency to misinterpret ordinary
bodily sensations in patients prone to health anxiety (Salkovskis & Clark, 1993). In
chronic pain, the cognitive model would postulate that the meaning with which the
pain is invested plays a large role in shaping behavioural patterns adopted and
emotions experienced (Turk, Meichenbaum & Genest, 1983). For example, an acute
sense of helplessness in the face of severe pain may foster a hopeless attitude,
culminating in a loss ofmotivation to manage pain levels. On the other hand,
perceptions that pain can be controlled can increase pain tolerance. Bowers (1968)
demonstrated that subjects tolerated more pain when they were in a position to turn
off the pain stimulus (which they chose, on occasion, not to do).
Studies concerned with the cognitive factors influencing health behaviours have
generated a number of social cognitive models eg. the Health BeliefModel
(Rosenstock, 1974), the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzan, 1991), Protection
Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1983), Self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977), and Social
Regulation Theory. (Leventhal et al, 1980). Core cognitive dimensions across these
models include perceptions of threat - perceived illness susceptibility and severity
(HBM, PMT, SRT), perceived costs and benefits of health behaviours (HBM, PMT),
and perceived control of illness/self efficacy, (TPB, PMT, SRT, Self -efficacy). As an
example, Self Regulation Theory proposes that the individual perception of the threat
posed by illness determines, in large measure, the degree ofmotivation to address
health concerns. Existing knowledge and beliefs about illness are considered to
interact with the appraisal of health related information. Within this model, the
cognitive representation of the illness has five main components (a) identity (the name
and symptom cluster of the condition), (b) time line (is the condition cyclical, acute,
recurrent, chronic etc), (c) causes (personal beliefs regarding the underlying causative
factors involved), (d) consequences (expectancies regarding the impact of the
condition) and (e) cure/control (beliefs concerning the controllability or "curability"
of the illness).This illness representation maps on to an action component. That is to
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say, active coping efforts flow logically from the personal model or representation of
the illness.
Self-regulation theory has been used to understand a range of illness behaviours from
self-adherence to coping with chronic illness. In diabetes, research has clarified the
important dimensions of the personal meaning of illness for the individual. For
example, Hampsen, Glasgow & Toobert (1990) in a study of the personal models of
illness held by diabetic patients, identified four composite components informing their
understanding of the illness (cause, symptoms, treatment and seriousness). Personal
models incorporate the representation of the illness, knowledge or understanding,
attitudes, subjective experiences, and associated feelings (Petri & Weinman, 1997).
From the perspective of self-regulation theory, illness beliefs are assumed to play an
important role in shaping a person's subjective reaction to the health threat involved
and any health-related behaviour (Leventhal, Leventhal & Contrada, 1998). The
personal models approach, while consistent with the broad theoretical framework of
social cognition models, is distinctive by it's empirical grounding emanating from
clinical studies of patients.
In diabetes, specific features of personal models (illness beliefs) in both adults and
adolescents have been shown to be concurrently and prospectively related to self care
outcomes (Hampsen, Glasgow & Foster, 1995; Skinner & Hampsen, 1998). In
particular, beliefs about the effectiveness of diabetes treatment have been consistently
associated with dietary self-management in research. Personal models of treatment
effectiveness map on to Leventhal's illness representations of the control/care
components respectively. Further, beliefs about one's perceived personal control over
diabetes have also been postulated as mediating treatment outcomes. Bradley et al
(1990) demonstrated cross sectional associations between personal control and
improved treatment satisfaction, well being and glycaemic control. Hampsen,
Glasgow, & Strycker (2000) demonstrated, in an adult sample of diabetic patients,
that those with greater perceived control had lower blood sugar levels. As past levels
of blood sugar levels were controlled for in this study, there was an implication that
perceived control was rooted in underlying cognitive structures rather than historical
blood sugar levels.
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1.1.1. Illness Beliefs & Cognitive Schemas
Social cognitive models of illness behaviours have emphasized the role of beliefs
about the illness in particular in the absence of any concern with broader belief
systems characterising the individual's relationship to himself and the world.
Williams (1997) proposed a new cognitive model of dysfunctional illness behaviour
which embraces nonillness beliefs in addition to more specific illness representations.
He gives primacy to the net interaction of these sets ofbeliefs which, in turn, shape
the unique meaning of the illness for that person. Regarding core belief systems
unrelated to illness, the schema concept has been given great emphasis in the
cognitive model of depression (Beck et al, 1979). Described as relatively stable
enduring cognitive representations which ensure a consistency in response across
similar types of events, such underlying structures are hypothesized to fundamentally
shape both emotional states and behavioural responses. William's model is antedated
by others who have considered the role of beliefs other than illness beliefs in
dysfunctional illness behaviour (in particular beliefs about the self and others). As an
example, Taylor (1983) described how the need for mastery/control may distort
illness beliefs to maintain self-esteem and hope for the future. In his cognitive
adaptation model of illness, the process of adjustment is centred on three themes - a
search for meaning, an attempt to gain a sense ofmastery or control of the illness, and
the need to restore self esteem. Meaning refers to a persons understanding of the
implications an illness has for themselves, their relationships with others, their
priorities and future goals. An individual who values, finds meaning in, and thereby
strives for mastery experiences in life (competency/control schemas), may develop
positive illusions of control in an illness context which may have relative degrees of
uncontrollability. This would be a case of an illness belief being honed to accord with
an underlying self defining belief system. In other words, schematic nonillness beliefs
supersede reality considerations to create conscious illness beliefs consistent with
underlying schemas. Alternatively, a situation may arise whereby, in the face of
incontrovertible evidence of illness uncontrollability, health concerns are denied to
maintain illusions of control/mastery in life generally. In other words, the breaching
of core beliefs evokes a defensive reaction which reinstates the status quo but at a
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health cost to the individual ( demotivation and disengagement from health self care
behaviours).
Foumier et al (2002), in a comparison study of three chronic diseases (diabetes,
rheumatoid arthritis, and multiple arthritis) found that optimistic control beliefs
(positive outcome expectations, positive efficacy expectations, and positive unrealistic
thinking) associated with the illness were emotionally adaptive when the disease
aspects were to a large extent controllable; with lesser degrees of disease
controllability, however, optimistic beliefs about control were less beneficial to
emotional adjustment. Similarly, in a study of 92 patients with rheumatoid arthritis,
Affleck et al (1987) found a negative relationship between illusory beliefs of illness
control and emotional adjustment in those with advanced or worsening symptoms,
suggesting that failure to relinquish control beliefs in the face of evidence to the
contrary may be emotionally distressing. The authors speculated that preoccupation
with controllability factors possibly derived from an inability to exercise effective
control over the illness. Within the context of diabetes, unyielding rigid needs for
mastery and control (reflecting the operation of specific self schemas) could, in
interaction with periodically erratic or uncontrollable blood sugar levels, lead to
extreme feelings of failure and hopelessness about the prospect of controlling the
condition. Another individual, struggling with the same "moving target" (erratic blood
sugar levels) but in the context ofmore moderate, flexible self schemas may retain
some belief in the possibility of controlling the illness which, in turn, may lead to a
sustaining of self care efforts. Similarly, beliefs about others may also have an impact
on illness behaviour. Underlying rigid belief systems ('others can never be pleased',
for example,) could impair trust in health professionals, fuel resentment, and
ultimately undermine self confidence and motivation to address diabetes self care
behaviours. Thus, beliefs about the self, others and the world, may, in combination
with more specific illness representations, have a strong bearing on illness behaviour.
Both SRT and the personal models approach are limited as clinical models by the
peripheral role accorded to nonillness beliefs (beliefs about the self and others). One
would, according to Williams, anticipate an interactional effect between beliefs about
the self /others and illness beliefs (perceived controllability, perceived seriousness,
and perceived treatment effectiveness, for example). According to Leventhal &
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Cameron (1987) characteristic representations of the self, and illness representations
are interrelated, with one colouring, and, in turn, being coloured by, the other
In Williams' cognitive model of dysfunction illness behaviour (an advance on social
cognitive models which give primacy to illness beliefs), changes to the self schema
may be necessary to effect changes in the illness representation and, thus, illness
behaviours. For example, in diabetes, the core belief "I have to be perfect" may give
rise to lack of confidence in striving for diabetes control given that perfect control is
unattainable. This, in turn, could result in avoidance of coping efforts to minimize any
sense of failure arising from unattainable goals. From a clinical perspective,
adjustment to diabetes in this context may be best facilitated by challenging
fundamental needs for perfection before beliefs about personal control of the
condition can be modified. In Williams' model, self schemas are thus afforded a
central role as a composite of core beliefs interacting with the personal models of the
illness. As stated above, self schemas can be considered enduring consistent beliefs
about how individuals perceive themselves, their relationships with others and the
world in which they live. Such core beliefs can be adaptive or unhelpful, flexible or
rigid, dormant or continuously active. They may reflect themes concerning the need
for mastery, competency, achievement, control, low self worth, personal vulnerability
etc. These fundamental evaluative beliefs, may, in turn, shape the interpretation of a
specific illness. Cognition, emotion, and behaviour are thus deemed to be interrelated
in this model.
1.1.2. Interacting Cognitive Subsystems Approach
Beck's cognitive model, as described above, places conscious meaning at the heart of
his explanatory framework when contemplating emotion production. The primary
concern is with stream-of-consciousness thinking somewhere within the range of
personal awareness. This rather narrow treatment of cognition as consciously
experienced thoughts and images is in contrast to the applied cognitive science
position which situates the majority of cognitive processing at more implicit or remote
levels of awareness. For example, in clinical settings, it is commonly observed that
people report emotional states without being able to identify any commensurate
conscious thoughts to account for their feelings. Moreover, therapeutic efforts
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targeting purely conscious thinking are often ineffective in changing the emotional
response. Thus, cognition defined exclusively as conscious ideational activity with
verbal or pictorial content appears to have shortcomings as an explanatory construct
when trying to comprehensively understand the link between cognition and emotion.
Mindful of the problems encountered by Beck's cognitive model, Teasdale & Barnard
(1991,1993) expanded the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems framework (a framework
shaped by empirical findings in cognitive science to account for all forms of
information processing) to further illuminate the complex interaction of cognition and
emotion (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991; Teasdale & Bernard, 1993).
Within the interactive cognitive subsystems approach, there are two kinds ofmeaning
- a specific and a more holistic intuitive level ofmeaning (Teasdale et al, 1993). In
contrast to more traditional cognitive models which emphasize specific meaning
content in propositional form, ICS suggests that holistic implicit meanings are the
primary determinants of emotion production. This implicit knowledge is rooted in
schematic models of experience, that is, conceptual representations of
interrelationships between generic features of experience - high level recurring
regularities that have been extracted from life's experiences. Representation at this
level is at a high level of abstraction, and is generic and thematic in content. The
analogy between a sentence and a poem is illustrative. A sentence conveys specific
meanings directly related to particular arrangements of letters, phonemes and words.
The meaning is clear and unequivocal and is a direct function of the sequencing of the
constituent elements. A poem, on the other hand, contains holistic meanings that are
not reducible to the specific meaning content: rather, the sequencing of sentences
together with sensory contributions from visual imagery, sounds of the words,
rhythms employed evoke transcendent 'felt senses' or higher order meanings which
do not map directly onto language.
According to ICS, more specific meaning levels may only affect emotional responses
insofar as they feed into, and contribute to the regeneration of affect-schematic
models (holistic meanings). Accordingly, while specific beliefs (eg. illness
representations) can be therapeutically reshaped to effect change in the parent
schematic model, it is holistic rather than specific propositional meanings that should
be the primary focus of change. Subjectively, such implicit meaning is characterized
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by experiential 'senses' or feelings with implicit meaning content: 'on top of things', '
in control', 'hopelessness'. In diabetes, physiological factors beyond a persons control
often intervene to undermine self care efforts and ensure that personal standards of
performance may not be met. As a medical condition, it is thus tailor-made to activate
dysfunctional schematic models (sense of helplessness, loss of control, failure) in
those individuals whose predominant motivational schemas incorporate
achievement/control/ perfectionist strivings. In other words, the immediate felt sense
('out of control' for example), although projected on to a specific situation in the
present (loss of diabetes control), possibly reflects a generic theme which is integral to
the personality structure. One implication is that such generic parent schematic
models should themselves be addressed to attenuate their disruptive effects in specific
situations i.e. diabetes selfmanagement.
As earlier stated, a distinctive emphasis at the heart ofWilliams (1997) dysfunctional
illness behaviour model is the interaction between the beliefs about the meaning of
the illness (the illness representation) and beliefs about self, others, and the world.
With regard to the interaction between this illness belief triad (beliefs about the
illness; beliefs about the self, others, and the world they live in), and other nonillness
related beliefs, there are multiple feedback loops which ensures that information
processing at each stage influences the processing at the next stage. This proposition
about the interaction between multiple belief systems as the crucial mediating
mechanism is consistent with the ICS approach. In highlighting the importance of the
interaction effect between different levels ofmeaning or belief, Williams is,
implicitly, invoking, an appraisal pattern which transcends the specifics of the
immediate situation ( eg. the illness situation) to partially reflect more generic holistic
cognitive themes abstracted from life's recurring regularities. If thematic content is
prepotent (ICS position), appraisals regarding specific contemporary situations may
thus be primarily shaped by the 'undifferentiated schematic residue' ofmultiple
congruent historical experiences. Williams model (1997) and the ICS perspective are
similar in their consideration of core cognitive structures as 'shapers' of context
specific meanings. However, while Williams proposes an interaction effect between
sets of prepositional beliefs at different levels of generality and awareness, (illness
versus non-illness explicit beliefs), ICS details a more fundamental undifferentiated
implicit 'felt sense' abstracted from life's recurring regularities as the immediate
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precursor to emotional reactions. In other words, an implicit thematic meaning level
which speaks to the history of regularities in the individuals past experiences and is
beyond the immediate 'givens' of the current situation.
Consistent with position statements by Williams (1997) regarding the need to embed
our understanding of dysfunctional illness behaviour within the context ofbeliefs
about the self, others, and the illness, clinical experience of diabetes-related
adjustment problems often suggests that underlying schemas and related reaction
tendencies need to be addressed. Much of the diabetes research literature, however,
tends to address the problems of diabetes management independently of these less
proximal 'person' variables (Glasgow, 1995). Such models, as described above,
provide an opportunity to test specific hypotheses and predictions. In particular, there
is a direct implication that more distal self schemas have an impact on behavioural
and emotional outcomes and that such effects may be mediated by illness beliefs. The
clinical implication is that therapeutic interventions may have to address multiple
levels ofbelief systems for optimal clinical outcomes.
1.2. Emotional Rumination, Cognitive Biases, and Distress
The strong association between diabetes and depression has been repeatedly
demonstrated (as has the link between chronic illness in general and depression).
Peyrot & Rubin (1997) reported that 41.3 % of diabetes sufferers have significantly
elevated levels of depressive symptoms. Lustman et al (1997) reported that levels of
diagnosable depression in diabetes patients are about three times the estimated
prevalence in the general population and that it is associated with poor glycaemic
control and an increased risk for medical complications. Moreover, the depressive
course may be chronic and severe in diabetes, with an average of four depressive
episodes over a five year period (Lustman et al, 1996). Indeed, depression and
diabetes may be mutually antagonistic at both the neuroendocrine and psychological
levels. Hormonal dysregulation associated with depression may aggravate glycaemic
dysregulation (and vice versa). Equally, feelings of helplessness and hopelessness
associated with depression may grossly disrupt self care behaviours, resulting in
worse metabolic control, a progressive sense of powerlessness, and possible
deepening of depression (Rubin & Peyrot, 1994).
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Similarly, although research on the association between anxiety and diabetes is
relatively sparse, one study (Peyrot & Rubin, 1997) found that individuals with
diabetes may suffer from anxiety disorders as much as they do of depression and
certainly with much higher rates that that found in the general population. In this
particular study of 600 individuals, the presence of two or more long term
complications was the only diabetes related predictor of significant anxiety
symptoms. Anxiety symptoms typically reflect an exaggerated emotional response to
ordinary sources of threat in a person's life. In diabetes, however, fear and tension can
be constant due to the ever present threat of hypoglycaemia, long term complications,
and the day to day stresses ofmanaging a difficult condition. Anxiety and depression
are often comorbid conditions and, indeed, there is an area of symptom overlap across
these disorders. An established common factor central to the onset and maintenance
of these related symptoms is the process of negative rumination.
Research has demonstrated an interplay between emotion regulation processes and
cognition such that a proneness to excessive rumination under stress frequently gives
way to increased cognitive biases and related mood disturbance. The link between
rumination and depression is well established (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) as is the
association between detached mindfulness and the curtailment of the ruminative
process (Ramel et al, 2004). Further, empirical studies of cognitive theories of
depression have identified negative cognitive styles and negative rumination
secondary to depressed mood as risk factors for depressive episodes. Robinson &
Alloy (2003) in a sample of 148 initially non-depressed graduates, found that the
interaction of negative cognitive styles and stress reactive rumination predicted the
prospective onset, number, and duration, of depressive and hopelessness episodes.
Such interactions were not replicated when other measures of trait self-focus and
depressive rumination were used instead of stress reactive rumination. In this
particular study, rumination was described as a tendency to focus on maladaptive self-
referential thoughts following a stressful event. Lavender & Watkins, E (2004)
demonstrated that rumination exacerbates negative cognitive biases in depression,
resulting, for example, in greater negative future thinking in depressed patients.
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One implication of this association is that a tendency toward rumination may
constitute the more primary etiological factor underpinning emotional distress with
cognitive biases/beliefs operating as mediating factors. This is consistent with the ICS
position (Barnard & Teasdale, 1993) which considers implicit felt senses -
conceptually laden experiences - to be prepotent in emotion production. Compulsive
negative ruminations are frequently accompanied by a near preverbal sense of being
mentally 'out of control' - a feeling that thinking is unnaturally constrained,
inflexible, unproductive and ultimately distressing. Traversing repeatedly the same
'cognitive grooves' may well be the very mechanism which maintains, and intensifies
such cognitive rigidity. The gradual consolidation of negative belief systems may
ultimately be secondary conscious derivatives of this implicit 'loss of control' schema
associated with ruminative thinking.
In addition, a proneness to rumination under stress may act as an impediment to
rational problem solving in that, by its very nature, worrying ruminations are
anathema to constructive action. Rather, they constitute an indeterminate process
entailing a largely passive absorption with a person's own thought processes. In
diabetes, the capacity for self-care behaviour is predicated on a capacity for rational
problem solving in that an understanding of the relationship between key variables,
namely, food intake, exercise requirements, insulin dosage, and blood sugar levels is
required to facilitate trial and error learning which itself acts as s feedback loop which
further refines understanding of the relationships involved. A proneness toward
excessive emotional rumination could be inimical to this process. Discrepancies in
goal progress combined with an inability to disengage from thwarted goals
(perfectionist standards) may typically give rise to a prolonged ruminative tendency
with related depressive affect (Martin & Tesser, 1996). Within this perspective, those
who experience more frequent or salient discrepancies between ideal and actual
outcomes may manifest a greater tendency to ruminate.
Past research on stress and ill health has mainly considered levels of exposure to life
events. However, as the range of responses to similar situations is many and varied, it
is suggested that individual differences in response style may be a much stronger
determinant of the stress response. A tendency toward emotional rumination may
constitute one such moderating individual difference in stress reactivity.
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1.3. Emotion Inhibition & Distress
According to Traue & Deighton (2000), emotional inhibition (a 'holding back' or
suppressing tendency) is a maladaptive interaction pattern typically characterised by
reduced spontaneous expression, unemotional language, and social apprehension. It
refers generically to the incomplete processing of emotional stress when bodily
changes (physiological, endocrinological, or immunological) are triggered by the
stressors in question and the natural cognitive, emotional and behavioural processes
are distorted. Subjective experience and spontaneous expression of emotions and
action tendencies are constrained, resulting in inner conflict, psychological distress
and distorted interpersonal dynamics. In essence, it is a form of defensive relating.
In suppressive inhibition, emotional arousal is recognised by the person but
spontaneous expressive and cognitive behaviours are automatically suppressed.
Cultural conditioning may help to shape this coping strategy. For example, if
individuals risk emotional expression under stressful circumstances, negative
reinforcement from significant others may initiate a learning history which effects a
gradual decrease in spontaneous expressiveness. This can be clearly seen in gender
differences in emotional expression. Males are programmed from an early age to hide
their vulnerability to maintain the stereotypical male self image. As a result, they can
be greatly incapacitated in the work of emotional disclosure and may, as a result,
experience considerable difficulties in intimate personal relationships. Women, on the
other hand, have a natural penchant for feeling expression; as a result, their emotional
bonds are often deeper and more enduring. Historical conditioning condones and
encourages the expression of vulnerability in women, with an unstated subtext that the
'harder' emotions (anger, drive to succeed etc) belong firmly in the male dominion.
1.3.1.Psychological Precursors ofInhibition
From an evolutionary point of view, stress hormones are essential for mobilizing
energy under stress (a heightened sense of threat). In the present age, many sources of
threat comprise the many obvious and not so obvious social-emotional dangers to our
self esteem in a world which continually agitates for mastery, achievement, success
and conformity in the realms of work, family, and relationships. Such dangers are
often intensified by pre-existing vulnerabilities rooted in dysfunctional childhood
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attachments. Fears/conflicts over emotional expression may reflect unconscious
expectations of retaliation from others based on relationship experiences in the
formative years or possibly in later life. In diabetes research, the DAWN report
(Albert, 2002) highlights the importance of family/social support in emotional
adjustment and metabolic control. Tendencies toward nagging, criticism, etc by a
partner typically undermine emotional adjustment and diabetes control. Social
environments of this type, characterized by an absence of' emotional disclosure
safety' ( fear of retaliation), may serve to fossilize emotional inhibitory tendencies,
Devoid of the capacity for the spontaneous and natural expression of feelings, internal
psycho-physiological tension is thus regularly created which, in turn, effects chronic
strain at the bodily level. Thus, emotional regulation processes such as inhibition and
rumination appear to constitute psychological survival mechanisms which partially
protect against the threat of injuries to the self in an emotionally unsafe world. In
inhibition, the self remains in hiding; in rumination, the person is 'going it alone' in
his perseverative mentalizing efforts to solve difficulties without the aid of another.
That they are associated but distinct psychological processes is supported by Rogers
(1997) finding that they are statistically related but orthogonal constructs when
operationally defined. Introspective observation often indicates that one ruminates
more in so far as one inhibits expression of feelings to others (inhibited expression
invites lack of resolution of conflictual feelings which, in turn, may fuel the
unrelenting pressure to engage in solipsistic unproductive ruminating).
Research supports the importance of emotional expression in psychological health
(Paez et ah, 1999). In diabetes research, type 1 patients who underwent written
disclosure assignments demonstrated less depressive symptoms and fewer incidence
of physical illness (Boder, 2004). Self-concealment (a variant of emotional inhibition)
has been shown to be related to psychological distress (Cepeda-Benito & Short,
1998), anxiety, and depression ( Larson & Chastain, 1990). In a study of
perfectionism involving 116 undergraduate women, path analysis indicated that a
tendency to conceal negative personal information (self concealment) has been shown
to mediate the relationship between maladaptive perfectionism and psychological
distress (Kawamura & Frost, 2004). In keeping with this finding, the frequently
documented phenomenon of 'bogus logs' of blood sugar readings by diabetes
sufferers may reflect a fear of disclosure associated with unrealistic expectations
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either within the patient or the clinician. Greenberg & Lepore (2004) suggest that
emotional disclosure helps people to tolerate and regulate negative feeling states
through habituation and cognitive reappraisal of emotions. Moreover, the need for
social sharing of emotional states may reflect a strong urge for people to " reimmerse
themselves in the social consensus" (Rime et al, 2004, p.40). It accords with basic
tenets of attachment theory ( Bowlby, 1969) concerning a child's need for proximity
and connection with a parent when stressed. Emotional disclosure in adulthood serves
a similar function by reinstating 'felt security' through increased personal intimacy
with another and the emotional containment that this affords. Any tendency toward
emotional inhibition, in maintaining social disconnection at times of heightened
vulnerability, will incubate negative feeling states through the intensification and
distortion of negative thinking patterns/appraisals. The absence of 'corrective
feedback' from others when the self is concealed in this way may also be
contributory. In diabetes, the sense ofbeing different, the perceived social stigma, the
perceived lack of understanding of others, the underlying fear of complications, and
perceived difficulties in controlling the condition all conspire to heighten the sense of
personal distress and alienation from the mainstream social world. Such negative
illness appraisals, which are often the immediate conscious precursors of distress
states in diabetes, may thus be a function of emotional inhibitory tendencies within
the personality.
1.4. Coping in Diabetes
Coping style refers to the ways that people typically respond to challenging or
stressful situations in their lives. For some researchers, coping behaviour is thought
to be consistent across situations, whereas for others, it is very much determined by
situational specifics. Lazarus (1984) in his transactional model of stress and coping,
attended to both the process of threat appraisal and the perceived resources to deal
with the level of threat involved. Such a model is useful in understanding people's
adaptation to illness and disease. In Lazarus' model, coping responses are broadly
categorized as problem focussed or emotional focussed strategies. In the latter,
attention is directed to a person's inner emotional/ psychological reaction as the key
ingredient which mediates coping. For example, disclosing emotions when stressed,
emotional acceptance of an illness, mentally detaching from the situation, avoiding
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thinking about the illness etc can be considered emotional coping responses, whether
adaptive or maladaptive. On the other hand, a response which attempts to alter the
situation in a practical way e.g. removing the source of threat, gathering information,
planning a response to address the source of threat etc can be deemed a problem
focussed strategy.
Research has consistently identified key general coping styles which tend to be
deployed across stressful situations. Roger et al (1993), using factor analysis,
identified a rational coping style, an avoidant style of responding, and a tendency
toward emotional detachment. Consistent with other research, such findings, broadly
speaking, map on to the problem versus emotional distinction. Emotion focussed
strategies, in contrast to problem solving approaches, reflect a sense of resignation
and powerlessness in relation to stressors and consequently are more nonaction
orientated and intrapsychic in character. The deployment of such strategies may be an
indicator of the perceived level of controllability of life stressors. A related area of
research interest is whether there needs to be an optimal matching between coping
style and the degree of controllability of stressors encountered. Diabetes, for example,
is an enduring condition which has both controllable (self care behaviour) and
uncontrollable aspects (metabolic and stress influences on glycaemic control). Face
validity would thus suggest that the coping process may require both problem solving
capacities and strategies for regulating emotional distress.
Diabetes is distinctive in that it is one of those rare conditions that lends itself to self-
regulation by the patient. Processes that are normally automatically performed -
metabolic processes - need to be behaviourally regulated. A psychological burden
typically co-exists with this sense of health responsibility. The emotional toll is
compounded by the actual or anticipated emergence of diabetic complications over
time (e.g. blindness, amputations, heart disease). Despite this, there is good evidence
to indicate that many do succeed in mastering their self-care requirements and that
rational problem solving is frequently deployed in the service of this task. For
example, a number of studies have concluded that sustained adherence to diabetes
requirements involved active coping on the part of patients. Smari & Valtysdottir
(1997), for example, investigated the relationships between dimensions of
dispositional coping (task orientation, emotional oriented coping and avoidance) on
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the one hand, and levels of psychological distress and perceived adaptation to diabetes
on the others. Coping was related to both self-reported adaptation to the disease and
general psychological distress. Regarding the specific dimensions of coping, task
oriented coping was related to positive outcomes whereas emotion oriented coping
was related to negative outcomes. Sultan & Heurtier-Hartemann (2001) in a sample of
97 IDDM patients, found that task oriented coping style, presence of complications,
and diabetes related distress were the main predictors ofmetabolic control (with the
relations between psychological predictor variables and metabolic control closer for
women). Karlsan (2002) compared different coping styles in a sample of 534
Norwegian adults aged 25 to 70 with type 1 and type 2 diabetes. A substantial
proportion of the participants, particularly those with Type 2 diabetes, reported that
they seldom engaged in active task oriented coping such as seeking social support,
seeking knowledge, and planning. The study pointed up ample potential for
improving active problem solving in adults with diabetes. Enzlin, Mathiew &
Denyttenaere (2002) reported that men used significantly more active coping, less
avoidance, less social support seeking, and less depressive coping than woman in a
sample of 280 adults with Type 1 diabetes. Glycaemic control was not significantly
better in men than in women however. Depressive coping and depressive
symptomotology were the psychological factors which predicted psychological
adjustment to diabetes in both men and women. Similarly, Fournier et al (2002), in
researching adaptation to chronic illness, found that task oriented rather than emotion
oriented coping increased optimism and psychological wellbeing. In a study of 126
noninsulin dependent outpatients, prospective analyses indicated that problem solving
measures were significant predictors of levels of dietary and exercise self care at 6
month follow up (Toobert & Glasgow, 1991). Finally, a brief diabetes problem-
solving inventory (DPSI) was evaluated for its validity, reliability, sensitivity to
intervention and relationship to change in behaviour. In a sample of 279
postmenopausal women with type 2 diabetes, mediation analysis indicated that an
increase in problem solving behaviour was a partial mediator of diabetes outcomes
(Glasgow et al, 2004).
In contemplating the diversity of outcomes in diabetes (emotional adaptation, self-
care behaviour, glycaemic control), one can speculate about the value of certain
coping styles in relation to specific outcomes. Might a rational coping style be more
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adaptive within the context ofmotivational behaviours addressing the more
controllable domains of blood sugar control and self-care behaviour, with emotional
strategies (detachment, disclosure) having greater utility in the field of emotional
adjustment?
1.5. Human Motivation and Self-Determination Theory
To quote Ryan & Deci (2000) "human beings can be proactive and engaged or,
alternatively, passive and alienated, largely as a function of the social conditions in
which they develop and function". The self-determination theoretical perspective
( Deci & Ryan, 1985) is concerned with human motivation and personality. Its
primary focus is the investigation of the innate psychological needs that underlie
human motivation and personal well being and of the social conditions that facilitate
the meeting of those needs. The theory makes a key distinction between motivations
that are autonomous and those deriving from some internalised controlling agency.
Autonomous motivation is commonly characterised by human strivings which are
authentic, rooted in personal volition, and have inherent value for the individual.
Controlled motivation, on the other hand, derives from the wholesale internalisation
of others' value systems, resulting in behaviour which is typically forced, compulsive,
and joyless. A system of negative reinforcement operates in that the cessation or
attenuation of such compulsivelymotivated behaviour evokes feelings of guilt which,
in turn, impels the person toward further inauthentic action. Assor, Roth, & Deci
(2004) for example, found support for their hypothesis that parental use of conditional
regard as a socializing practice predicted their offsprings introjected internalization
(reflected by a sense of internal compulsion), behavioural compliance, perceived
parental disapproval, resentment toward their parents and fluctuations in self esteem.
In short, while conditional regard promoted the enactment of expected behaviours,
there were significant emotional costs for the adult children.
Research has indicated that directives, imposed goals, and pressured evaluations, lead
to the undermining of intrinsic motivation (resulting in perceived external locus of
causality). Opportunities for self direction and personal choice associated with an
acknowledgement of one's feelings have, on the other hand, been shown to enhance
feelings of autonomy and engender more intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1995).
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In education, for example, teachers deemed to be more autonomy supportive in their
approach to teaching engender in their students greater intrinsic motivation, hunger
for challenge, and curiosity (Flink, Boggiano & Barrett, 1990). Further, teachers who,
themselves, are subject to pressures from above (compliance with the curriculum,
colleagues, performance standards) and pressure from below (student alienation and
passivity) become less self-determined in their teaching habits and, thus, more
controlling in relation to their students (Pelletier, Legault & Seguin-Levesque, 2002).
Similarly, students tutored with a controlling style exhibit diminished initiative in
learning effectively, especially in creative conceptual processing (Utman, 1997). In
childrearing research, autonomy supportive parents, relative to controlling parents,
tend to have children who are more intrinsically motivated (Grolnick & Ryan, 1989).
In diabetes, Williams (1998) and his colleagues, in a prospective design, demonstrated
that patients perceptions of autonomy supportiveness from their diabetes health care
providers related to increased patient autonomous motivation, increased perceived
competence, and improvements in glucose control over twelve months. In a follow
up study, Williams et al (2004) found that changes in perceptions of autonomy and
competence predicted changes in glycaemic control.
Self determination theory articulates the social conditions, contemporary and
historical, which shape these different types ofmotivations. To the extent that
personal autonomy is respected and nurtured, core motivations will derive from
authentically chosen goals/interests, and, most likely, will be self-sustaining.
Autonomy supportive contexts involve taking a person's perspective, acknowledging
their feelings and minimizing pressure. In other words, relationships which are
sensitive to the personal needs of the individual will assist the development of
authentic and self sustaining motivational tendencies. Controlling contexts, on the
other hand, involve pressure from another to think, feel, or behave in a particular way.
When narcissistic agendas are imposed upon an individual to the extent that personal
autonomy is suppressed or curtailed, with the implicit subtext that approval/
acceptance by others requires conformity to their values and espoused cultural
behaviours, motivational strivings that evolve will be forced, inauthentic, and
unstable. For example, various studies have shown increased interest, confidence,
persistence and enhanced performance in those people whose motivation is self-
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authored, relative to those whose goal directed behaviours are associated with a sense
of external control (Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne & Ilardi, 1997).
When attempting to inculcate behavioural patterns in others, one can meet with
varying degrees of success, ranging from a rather inert amotivational state
(unwillingness), through passive compliance, to active personal commitment to stated
goals. From a self-determination perspective, such motivational gradations reflect the
extent of internalisation ( 'to take in') and integration (a sense of ownership
emanating from ones psychological core) of salient values and derivative behaviours.
Regarding the socialization process from childhood onwards, psychological processes
such as internalisation/integration are central to the self- regulation of behaviour
throughout the lifespan. One difficulty is that many behaviours are not intrinsically
interesting or valued, and, as such, may not be spontaneously adopted; rather, they
have to be encouraged or shaped in the interest of the wellbeing of the individual or
those around him. As a theory, SDT is particularly concerned with the processes
through which such nonintrinsically motivated behaviours may eventually become
self-determined. A crucial determinant, within this framework, is the nature of social
and environmental influences, past and present. The theory attempts an elucidation of
the characteristics of varying social environments which predispose to different
motivational patterns i.e. a detailing of the social conditions that nurture as opposed to
undermine the processes of internalisation and integration. How to encourage or
promote autonomous regulation of behaviours which are nonintrinsically motivating
is ofmajor import in many areas of human endeavour (diabetes self care behaviour is
a prime example). In the absence of a healthy action-orientation, motivation may
become stagnant, intermittent, compulsive or driven by purely basic needs, to the
ultimate detriment of the individual.
As nonintrinsically motivated behaviours are not naturally adopted, the usual
socializing process entails the prompting, modelling, or valuing of such behaviours by
those with whom the person has, or hopes to have, some sort ofmentoring
relationship. Face validity would thus suggest that a sense of relatedness or emotional
connection to others is crucial to the process of internalisation. Thus, a tenet of SDT is
that emotionally supportive environments - positive relationships - are pivotal to the
internalisation process. In support of this, Ryan, Stiller & Lynch (1994) demonstrated
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that children who felt emotionally close to, and cared for by, their respective parents
and teachers, more fully internalised the regulation of positive school behaviours.
Behaviours only take on meaning and value in so far as core needs for relatedness are
met.
Perceived competence is, according to the theory, also central to the internalisation of
nonintrinsically motivated behaviours. Behaviours are more likely to be adopted if
there are high feelings of self-efficacy associated with the enactment of those
activities. Enhancing competence, according to the theory, should thus facilitate
internalisation (Vallerand, 1997). Prior exposure to optimal challenges in association
with effective, positive feedback is crucial to the development of self efficacy
feelings. Mastery strivings within the personality structure are thus a function of both
relatedness and self confidence.
Another major tenet of the theory, described earlier, is that the experience of
autonomy supportive conditions is a predisposing factor for behavioural regulation to
be fully integrated. Bearing in mind the distinction between controlled and
autonomous motivations, autonomous regulation which is fully integrated, can only
occur in the context of autonomy supportive conditions, against a background of
either prior or current supportive relationships and feelings of competence. The
experience of choice, volition and freedom from excessive external pressure to behave
or think precisely as others prescribe, paradoxically, enables an individual to actively
and voluntarily transform externally preferred values into their own. In the absence of
autonomy supportive conditions, it is mainly a form of controlled motivation which
will be cultivated, provided relatedness and competency needs are met.
In short, self-determination theory posits three innate, essential, and universal
psychological needs (relatedness, competence, autonomy) which, once satisfied,
enhance self-motivation and psychological well being, with the corollary that self
authored strivings and related well being are significantly undermined when such
needs are thwarted. Compulsive mastery strivings such as perfectionism and Type A
behaviour patterns can be considered a form of controlled or introjected regulation
wherein behavioural regulation is internalised but not integrated into the self structure.
In short, motivation is driven by intrapsychic external controlling agencies. At the
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level of conscious experience, behaviours may be performed to avoid guilt or anxiety
or to meet the needs of an introjected self-image such as pride, vanity etc. According
to Deci & Ryan (1995) controlled motivation of this type represents regulation by
self-esteem which is essentially contingent in nature. Assor, Roth, & Deci (2004)
showed, for example, that introjection mediated the association between conditional
regard as a socialization practice and behavioural compliance with expectations
1.5.1. Healthy & Compulsive Mastery Strivings
Rational problem solving (healthy mastery) has a generally positive connotation in
referring to a sense of active agency in the individual, reflecting a belief in their
ability to address or transcend the challenges posed. It implies a degree of
psychological hardiness or robustness deriving from a history of reasonably
successful attempts to address difficulties in a person's life. In essence, it reflects a
vibrant sense of agency, an active orientation in the world, fuelled by beliefs in the
potential for securing successful outcomes. The concept of self-efficacy, which is
essentially a construct reflecting beliefs or expectations about capacities for coping
with adverse situations (Bandura, 1977, 1982), sits comfortably with a rational coping
style. High self-efficacy is associated with better health outcomes and the use of
health enhancing behaviours (Bandura, 1997). In a study of the network of
psychological variables in diabetes (625 patients from 32 different treatment centres),
subjects with strong beliefs in their self efficacy demonstrated more active rational
coping which, in turn, was the only psychological predictor of HbAl c values (Rose et
al, 2002). As an attitude, it points up an active orientation in life, a desire for
engagement/commerce with the world to mould/shape according to one's needs. As
such, it can be characterized as a mastery striving which is healthy in nature ie. not
driven by unresolved compulsive psychological needs/conflicts.
This contrasts with dispositional mastery strivings which are more pathogenic in
nature. For example, individuals with perfectionist tendencies exhibit a pursuit of
mastery which is often compulsive and rigid in character. To that degree, it can be
characterised as a form of compulsive mastery striving. Similarly, individuals with
Type A personality patterns are often characterised by a competitive/achievement
orientation associated with agitation/hostility and insecurity. This sort of drive toward
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mastery tends to be more emotionally charged and general in character (as opposed to
the more situation specific aspect of perfectionism). In general, compulsive mastery
strivings tend to be more vulnerable to derailment than more benign or healthy drives
toward mastery.
In diabetes, such qualitatively different mastery strivings may have different
implications for the attainment of goals which, rather than being singular and time
limited, are continuous, unrelenting, and require perseverance over the life span. One
might argue that a rational coping style ( healthy mastery orientation), which
presupposes an emotionally contained personality, might lend itselfmore ably to the
attainment of long-term tasks/goals in comparison to more toxic achievement/
mastery strivings which imply a more brittle, conflicted personality with a propensity
for more capricious motivational effort in respect of long-term objectives. In short,
healthy mastery strivings (rational coping style) may be more successful in addressing
the adaptational tasks of diabetes compared to compulsive mastery strivings
(perfectionist or Type A behaviour).
1.5.2. Perfectionism, Mastery Strivings, and Diabetes
Perfectionism has been defined as "the setting of excessively high standards for
performance accompanied by critical self evaluation" (Frost, Marten, Lahart &
Rosenblate, 1990). The 'all or nothing'quality of such belief systems may not foster a
sufficiently flexible/resilient coping style consistent with the sustaining of effort
towards goals which are difficult to achieve. In recognition of this, interview themes
of parents of 30 adolescent girls with insulin dependent diabetes mellitus (1DDM)
included ' letting go of perfectionism' among their strategies for helping their children
cope with the challenges of diabetes. To quote one parent' I don't get hung up on
one blood sugar number any more.. .1 pick the most important battles and let the rest
go'. (Mellin et al, 2004). Fear of failure is the undercarriage of perfectionist strivings
- sometimes resulting in avoidant tendencies (procrastination, premature termination
of effort, reluctance to undertake tasks in the first instance etc) to guard against the
possibility of failure. However, where efforts have been expended in the service of
realizing high personal standards, a poor ratio of positive outcomes relative to
expended efforts may be corrosive of ones self esteem over the longer term. Indeed, at
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the level of cultural conditioning, the imperative toward excellence and success is
deeply embedded in the human psyche; societal programming serves to reinforce and
potentiate the effects of in-house indoctrination in perfectionist values.
Perfectionist behaviour reflects a frantic concern with obtaining approval which, in
turn, highlights insecurity at a personal level. This need for inclusion within the herd
indicates a clear dependency on others for feelings of 'okayness'. The weight and
centrality of these forces at an intrapsychic level will bear directly on the propensity
for negative affective and cognitive reactivity in any context which, by symbolic
association, 'maps onto' and thus activates core emotional needs and related defensive
structures. In diabetes, periodic monitoring/evaluating of glucose levels (self
checking, clinic evaluations) thus potentially resonates, at the affective level, with
early formative experiences imbued with a constant sense ofbeing evaluated (and
thus judged) by others, whether overtly, or implicitly by, for example, the prizing by
parents of high standards of performance, extolling the performances of others
(unfavourable comparisons), provision ofmodels of success etc.
Wrestling with diabetes has been described as like trying to keep a football six feet
permanently under water. Sustaining glycaemic control over the longer term can
require immense effort but, with help and support, can be achieved. Frequently,
despite continued efforts at control, blood glucose levels can be difficult to modulate
for reasons which may or may not be apparent. Indeed, research has demonstrated a
relatively weak relationship between self care efforts and metabolic control (Glasgow,
1987). Self reports often reveal a sense of failure and demoralization associated with
disappointing clinic-based glycosylated haemoglobin scores (a measure of average
blood glucose over a 3 month period ) particularly after a period of sustained effort to
maintain good control. Such descriptions mirror the sense of futility and unworthiness
of a child who rarely 'measures up' in his parents eyes irrespective of his performance
level. The existence of rigid cognitive structures (internalised parental injunctions)
concerning the need to succeed - achievement/ perfectionist beliefs - may well
constitute a psychological vulnerability in a domain where total success is not
possible. Moreover, according to Wolpert & Anderson (2001), in the present culture
of audit and evidence based practise, an exclusive focus on clinical treatment
standards in diabetes management may encourage a vulnerability to perfectionism in
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both patients and the clinicians. Given that behavioural science research has
demonstrated frequent associations between perfectionism and both behaviour and
mood disorders, it extracts a heavy price. If preordained standards drive professional
attitudes, ideal and unrealistic biological goals may be chased by the patient, with the
potential for frustration, demoralization and gradual demotivation always in close
proximity. Ramirez Basco (1998) details clearly the emotional and motivational
difficulties in diabetes care associated with perfectionistic attitudes in both patients
and clinicians.
The potential for frequent' lapses' in diabetes control to escalate into a sustained
cognitive/behavioural 'relapse' (low self efficacy/defeatist beliefs, loss of motivation,
poor emotional adjustment) is strong in this context (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). As
one patient declared at a diabetes conference "I feel I am being constantly judged by
my glucometer and it's for life ". The constant effort to stay invested indefinitely in
meeting targets without any obvious dividend ( save the vague proposition of staving
off serious heath problems over the longer term) has to be unique in both in the
unrelenting nature of demand and the leap of faith required. Added to this, the
impossibility of obtaining perfect control ensures that self care efforts will often go
unrewarded; at most, some intermittent reinforcement will be the norm. With such an
obscure relationship between self care efforts and control outcomes, staying invested
in diabetes management may thus require a soft 'internal critic' - one with moderate
expectations and allowing for average performance. This feedback system may be
better adapted to the vicissitudes of blood sugar control. Wolpert & Anderson (2001)
maintain that behaviour change is the only realistic goal for any patient and that
keeping the distinction between behavioural and biological goals is crucial to helping
a patient to remain engaged in their diabetes self care.
1.5.3. Type A, Mastery Strivings, and Diabetes
In the field of cardiac research, a constellation of psychosocial cardiac risk factors
was discovered by Friedman & Rosenman (1959, 1974). They observed that their
patients who had cardiac problems tended to be intense, competitive, concerned with
achievement, aggressive or hostile, over committed and time urgent. This particular
constellation, labelled as Type A Behaviour Pattern, was described by the authors as
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"an action emotion complex that can be observed in any person aggressively involved
in a chronic, incessant struggle to achieve more and more in less and less time, and if
required to do so, against the opposing efforts of other things and other persons"
(1974, p.67). Strube et al (1986) demonstrated that Type A individuals rated more
achievement-related adjectives as self descriptive, relative to those items devoid of
such traits. Similarly, Westra & Kuiper (1997), in their research on Type A self
descriptions, revealed themes centred on achievement-striving and accomplishment.
They described "a high degree of intensity in pursuing their goals (workaholic,
striving, labouring) with some suggestion of a hostile, angry substrate (explosive) in
self-definition." An earlier study by Westra & Kuiper(1996) found performance
evaluation, personal accomplishment and competitiveness with others as being the
specific dysfunctional cognitions which differentiate Type A from other domains of
psychological maladjustment. They reasoned that perfectionistic standards together
with the central importance ofperformance and accomplishment for self evaluation
may underlie the intense competitiveness witnessed in these individuals. Positive self
perceptions can only be maintained by high performance levels, as selfworth is
inextricably bound up with personal achievements. This constellation pattern fits well
with the concept of 'controlled motivation' described by self determination theory.
Glass (1977) reported that, when one is concerned mainly with Type A aspects such
as performance, perception of challenge, attributional style or motivational behaviours
evoked by the threat of loss ofmastery or personal control, a global Type A score is
an adequate predictor. As a global construct, Type A behaviours can all be regarded
as mastery strategies to maintain control in challenging situations and thereby
maintain self esteem (Glass, 1977).
Any primary schematic structures (eg. Type A) which intensely 'push' for mastery/
control in life could ensure that primacy is given to attainable goals, with other 'less
achievable' outcomes, such as managing diabetes, being subordinated in the
'strivings' hierarchy. This attitude, understandably, could negatively affect diabetes
self care behaviour and also, the emotional adjustment to the condition particularly
given that poor control often leads to both short and long term serious health
complications. Moreover, intense achievement strivings also give way to heightened
stress reactivity through time urgency, competitive anger/hostility, impatience etc.
The demanding requirements of the self care regimen may not fit well with a
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compulsive, busy lifestyle. In one study, being 'too busy' was the most common
reason cited for low levels of self-care across different components of the diabetes
regimen (Wilson, 1986). Diabetes, with all its treatment paraphernalia and related
routines, can be demanding of time and effort. One can understand how such health
concerns may suffer in one whose interaction with the social world is characterized by
compulsive attempts to achieve 'more and more in less and less time'.
1.5.4. Rumination, Compulsive Mastery Strivings, and Diabetes Distress
As earlier described, ruminative thoughts have been investigated as psychological
phenomena in their own right and for their relationship to emotional adjustment
variables. They have been defined as conscious thoughts revolving around a common
theme with a tendency to reoccur without immediate situational demands (Martin &
Tesser, 1996). For the authors, ruminative thoughts are triggered by the discrepancy
between an individual's goal and perceived progress towards this goal. The relevance
for diabetes management is clear. It is a domain which is fertile territory for the
growth of ruminative tendencies. With the inevitability of periodic discordance
between goals sought and outcomes attained vis a vis blood sugar levels, the stage is
set for internal psychological conflict. A further exacerbating predisposing factor for
internal conflict is the presence of perfectionistic strivings/belief systems. By
definition, perfection allows little room for error. Against the backdrop of a very
difficult area of human endeavour, perfectionism invites psychological conflict. A
tendency toward emotional rumination may well be a psychological derivative of such
core inflexible belief systems pertaining to human goals/standards within the context
of a difficult management task.
In support of this, Flett G., et al (2002), in correlational analyses of a sample of 65
students assessed on several psychological measures, reported that a tendency towards
perfectionistic cognitions (i.e. automatic thoughts involving perfectionistic themes)
was associated with a ruminative response orientation and a tendency to report
experiences of intrusive thoughts and images following stressful events. The study
supported the notion of a salient cognitive aspect to perfectionism and that the
experience of perfectionistic cognitions and related ruminative thoughts contribute to
levels of psychological distress. Flett, Greene, & Hewitt (2004) in a sample of 177
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undergraduate students, demonstrated that perfectionistic cognitions were strongly
associated with anxiety sensitivity involving fears of cognitive dyscontrol. Stober, J
(2001), in a sample of 180 students, demonstrated that worrying ruminations had
substantial correlations with procrastination and perfectionism, and, in particular, with
perfectionistic concern over mistakes and doubts. Moreover, worry, while unrelated to
excessively high parental standards, was related to parental criticism and expectations.
Theoretical models of the worry process posit a close relationship between worry and
procrastination (ie. impaired capacity for rational problem solving).
Perfectionists are known to cope with stress in self defeating ways. For example, they
may persevere with unrealistic standards, engage in ruminative thinking, be highly
self critical in relation to perceived failures with a related tendency to overgeneralise
the sense of failure, and experience a preponderance of negative emotions, etc. (Flett
et al 1991). In repeated surveys of levels of emotional distress in people with diabetes,
strong feelings of guilt when a person is 'off track' with their diabetes was one of the
items most consistently endorsed by the respondents ( Polonsky et al, 1995). Such self
blaming tendencies could be expected to be more pronounced in perfectionistic
individuals given their unrealistic standards and the fact that glycaemic control is
often unattainable as well as being an unending lifetime process requiring sustained
effort. Heightened sensitivity to failure experiences in perfectionistic individuals
would, in the context of nonattainment of goals, trigger acute feelings of
worthlessness, low self esteem, and related emotional distress.
As in perfectionism, research has identified that Type A subjects make sustained
efforts to achieve the best results in their performance and to excel in any tasks they
undertake (Perez Garcia & San Juan, 1996). Similarly, Type A personalities, with
their perennial need to achieve in competitive environments, may be ruminative prone
if constant discrepancies in goal progress are experienced. In diabetes, with the high
potential for intermittent loss of control in terms of both self-care behaviour and blood
sugar levels, Type A individuals may be more prone to engage in diabetes related
worrying ruminations and related distress. If proneness to worrying tendencies is
more pronounced in individuals who experience more frequent and salient
discrepancies between goals sought and goals attained, one can speculate that
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individuals with perfectionistic beliefs and/or Type A behavioural patterns may be
more emotionally distressed.
1.6. Stress-Illness Psychophysiological Pathways
Psychophysiological mechanisms connecting stress with illness involve the
autonomic, neuro-endocrine and immune responses that are activated under stress.
Core psychophysiological correlates of the stress response include the release of
cortical steroids from activation of the pituitary/adrenal cortical axis, activation of the
sympathetic nervous system through stimulation of the sympathoadrenal pathway, and
the adrenal medulla's release of catecholamines. The pattern of activation of
cardiovascular, metabolic, gastro-intestinal and immune responses covaries with the
nature of the demands and resources mobilised.
Stress induced psychophysiological responses can occur at different levels (Steptoe,
1997). Firstly, psychophysiological hyper reactivity, or exaggerated stress
responsivity may be characteristic. Susceptible individuals may demonstrate
exaggerated responsivity in specific physiological processes, as described above.
Functional and structural pathology may result if these responses are repeated or
sustained over lengthy periods.
Secondly, impaired health may be mediated indirectly through reduced vulnerability
and resistance to pathogens. Susceptibility to less serious infectious diseases such as
colds, influenza, herpes may be potentiated by emotionally induced immuno
suppression (Cohen & Herbert, 1996). The influence of such stress processes on
health vulnerability adds to our understanding of the connections between stress and
cancer (Garssen, 2004; Anderson, 1994). Stress plays a facilitating but not causal role
under many circumstances. Succumbing to disease will depend on the simultaneous
combination of stress induced vulnerability and exposure to infection in the presence
of pathogens.
Thirdly, the progression or stability of existing conditions may also be affected by
psychophysiological stress responses. Physiological responses may be provoked by
mood disturbances that lead to, for example, increased acidic gastrointestinal
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secretions, or episodes of cardiac arrhythmia and ischaema in patients with heart
disease, or disturbances in insulin regulation in diabetes. In consideration of the
general finding of fluctuating blood sugar levels in diabetes associated with stress
factors, it has been established that the pancreas is stimulated to release the hormone
glucagon which, together with the glococorticoids and the sympathetic nervous
system, raises circulating levels of blood glucose.
1.6.1. Emotional Rumination and Physiological Functioning
In the stress-coping-disease literature, the concept of rumination or perseverative
thinking, has, until recently, been largely neglected. In recent decades, research
interests tended to focus on discrete major life stress events which gradually gave way
to a growing interest in the cumulative strain ofmicro daily events and hassles. This
emphasis on the objective dimensions of external events contrasts with the current
interest in ruminative thinking which focuses on a subjective response characteristic
of the stressed individual. As earlier described, rumination or worry can be regarded
as a form of nonproductive problem-solving (Davy, 1994). Within the context of
Lazarus and Folkmans coping theory (Folkman, 1984), perseverative thinking or
rumination reflects a fixation in the domain of secondary coping.
Current thinking is that perseverative thinking is both a cognitive/emotional process
and a psychobiological mechanism underlying the stress/disease link. It is thought to
act as an internal or cognitive micro stressor as well as mediating the effects of other
more objective external stressors. In short, it is both a mediator of stress and a stressor
in itself. Physiological correlates ofworry and rumination have included enhanced
levels ofCortisol. Helhammer (1985) for example, associated rumination prior to
exams with higher salivary Cortisol levels. Similarly, Roger & Najarian (1998) found
a positive association between dispositional ruminative tendency and urinary Cortisol
during and after examinations. Perseverative thinking converts the immediate
psychological and physiological correlates of stressful experiences into prolonged
physiological activation which, in turn, predisposes to the development of somatic
pathology (Brosschot & Thayer, 1998). Unlike emotional inhibition which does not
mediate the effects of other more objective stressors (notwithstanding the
accumulative physiological cost of inhibiting), perseverative thinking directly
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mediates the impact of such stressors on physiology. The stressor is prolonged in
representational form (in imagery and/or thought), a process which can maintain the
activation of the organism through a prolonged state of action readiness under
conditions of high threat for the individual (Dalgleis & Power, 1999). Although the
level of psychological vigilance is raised, physiological activation is not considered to
be extreme. Rather, it is the duration of the response and the dysfunctional emotional
and autonomic regulations associated with it which comprise the core pathology.
In addition to concerns about ongoing or past stressors, a large part of daily worrying
often consists of anticipatory negative ruminations. Anticipating stressors and
anticipatory worrying are thus additional ways in which the duration of the
physiological response to stress is prolonged. For example, Smyth et al (1998), in a
sample of 120 participants, demonstrated that salivary Cortisol levels were enhanced
in individuals who were not only experiencing stressors but also anticipating further
stressors. Similarly, Spangler (1997) found pre-exam anticipatory stress responses
(cardiovascular, Cortisol and immunological) prior to an examination. In keeping with
this, diabetes involves the occurrence of ongoing stressors combined with
considerable anticipatory worrying. Polensky (1995), when developing the 'problem
areas in diabetes' psychometric instrument (PAID), revealed that items most
frequently endorsed by diabetic patients included feelings of guilt over mismanaging
their diabetes coupled with fears of possible complications in the future. Regarding
the content of ruminations/worries in patients with diabetes, Tak-Yingshiu, A. &Yee-
man Wong, R (2002), from a content analysis of thirteen participants, identified the
following: hypo and hyper glycaemia as a constant threat, sustaining optimal
glycaemic control, maintaining a working life, psychological burden of blood sugar
self-monitoring, and feeling alone with the threat involved. Thus, continuous or
intennittent anticipatory worry may also be an integral aspect of emotional adaptation
to diabetes.
A number of authors (Everson et al, 1996; Brosschot et al, 1998) have described
perceived uncontrollability of stress (with related feelings of hopelessness/
helplessness) as a crucial psychological stressor which possibly mediates the effect of
psychological attitudinal variables on physiological/health states. Brosschot et al
(1998), in a study of 86 male teachers, found a stressor-induced decrease in the
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number ofT helper cells in subjects perceiving low control of an acute stressor while
controlling for the effect of mood changes. In all probability, there is a mutual
nurturing relationship between perceived uncontrollability and perseverative thinking
which, in combination, serve to prolong the physiological activation of the organisms.
Experientially, compulsive ruminations can evoke feelings of loss of control of ones
own emotions and thought processes. In diabetes, the ever present threat of short and
long term complications is fertile ground for the development of negative
psychological attitudes (perceived uncontrollability). Ruminative thinking may be the
process which serves to maintain and intensify such attitudes.
1.6.2. Neurobiological Correlates ofRuminative Thinking
The involuntary, repetitive, and abstract nature of perseverative thinking can be
construed as a failure of inhibitory neural processes. Thayer & Lane (2002) described
negative rumination as resulting from the disinhibition of adaptive mechanisms
associated with the frontal lobes. Disinhibition of thalamic structures, being
associated with primitive neural circuits responsible for approach and avoidance
behaviour, triggers a range of threat related processes such as fear, hypervigilance,
and autonomic activity associated with the fight or flight response. Under ordinary
circumstances, within this network of reciprocally interconnected neuro structures, the
pre-frontal cortex exerts an inhibitory influence on thalamic structures concerned with
defensive behaviour. Accordingly, the organism retains the capacity for flexible
responding in association with shifting environmental demands. However, with
disruptions to this inhibitory network, rigid defensive reactions emerge with
associated autonomic, affective and attentional inflexibility (all of which are features
ofperseverative ruminations). Emotional rumination, in prolonging physiological
activation beyond the traditional reactivity period of a temporal stressor, may then be
a direct mediator of the relationship between stress factors and somatic pathology.
1.6.3. Emotional Inhibition and Physiological Functioning
For many years, a negative relationship between emotionally expressive behaviour
and autonomic responsivity has been demonstrated ie. the inhibition or holding back
of overt emotional expressiveness frequently resulting in an overreaction at the
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autonomic arousal level. This has informed theoretical speculations about the origin
and maintenance of psychosomatic disorders. Studies in the early part of the last
century identifying high physiological activity in subjects suppressing emotional
expression fashioned the concepts of internalisation (physiologically, within the
person ) and externalisation (behaviourally, outwardly directed), coping styles in the
service of psychic tension regulation (Traue & Deighton, 2000). The term
'internaliser' designates a person exhibiting a low level of emotional expressiveness
under stress in combination with high physiological arousal; an "externaliser", on the
other hand, combines high expressiveness with low levels of physiological arousal in
social situations. In the last decade, there has been renewed interest in the role of
emotional expression/ suppression in health (Kennedy, Moore & Watson, 1999).
Psychophysiologists are increasingly concerning themselves with the effects of
inhibiting or expressing emotions on physiological systems ( Labott et al, 1990). In
one study of emotional inhibition with a sample of 43 men and 42 women, the
experimental group (a suppression condition) demonstrated a mixed physiological
state characterized by decreased somatic activity, decreased heart rate, and increased
sympathetic nervous system activity (Gross & Levenson, 1997). Thus, although
inhibition may be adaptive in a short term social stress situation, it is frequently
associated with dysfunctional bodily reactions. Over the longer term, it is likely to
have a deleterious effect on the individual, at a neurobiological, social/behavioural
and/or cognitive level.
The research literature would, in general, suggest that emotional inhibition is
potentially harmful when it is related to immunological dysfunction, physiological,
endocrinological hyper arousal, longstanding dysregulation of emotions within the
person, and/or if it disturbs the individual's interpersonal relations. This finding also
receives indirect corroboration from the studies which verify that close personal
relationships, in assuaging negative emotions, enhance health partly through their
positive effects on immune and endocrine dysregulation (Kiecolt-Glaser et al, 2002).
Arguably, the benefits of interpersonal support are mediated by available
opportunities for emotional disclosure.
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1.6.4. Theory ofInhibition & Disease - Pennebaker (1989, 1995)
Pennebaker (1989,1995), in his theoretical speculations about emotional inhibition,
describes the process by which failure to confront traumatic events results in poor
health. The principal assumption of his theory of inhibition is that physiological work
is required to inhibit ongoing behaviour, thoughts and feelings. The heightened
autonomic responses of 'internalisers' may, it is proposed, reflect the work of
behavioural inhibition. With the progression of time, the physiological work of
inhibition functions as a low level accumulative stressor, depleting the body's
resources for resisting illness. As with all protracted stressors, this sustained
inhibition may thus give rise to increases in stress related conditions such as asthma,
skin and cardiovascular disorders, cancer, pain presentations etc.
Pennebaker (1988) theorizes that people need to express emotions generated by
stressful experiences. In general, energy is required to inhibit expression in contexts
characterized by disclosure fears. This process of inhibiting feelings, which naturally
strive for expression, is physiologically straining and stressful. Pennebaker maintains
that a behavioural inhibition system is recruited which, when activated, results in
negative health outcomes mediated through immuno suppression. This behavioural
inhibition system was initially proposed by Gray (1987). More commonly known as
the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory, Gray proposes two distinct neurological
systems, the behavioural Inhibition system (BIS) and the Behavioural Activation
System (BAS). The former is sensitive to signals of punishment, unfamiliarity and
nonreward, and of promoting anxiety and avoidant tendencies. The latter, on the hand,
is sensitive to reward experiences and relief from punishment and is associated with
approach behaviour. These major brain systems are thought to underlie the personality
dimensions of anxiety and impulsiveness ( which mirror the freezing response and
fight/flight response respectively which are activated under conditions of high threat).
In support of this, Knyazev et al (2002) demonstrated high beta and gamma EEG
activity in frontal lobe areas and low delta and theta activity in temporal, parietal and
left frontal areas in subjects high in BIS scores , a finding consistent with the
hypothesis that behavioural inhibition is associated with high cortical arousal,
particularly in the right hemisphere.
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1.6.5. Neurobiologies Correlates ofInhibition
Neurobiological correlates of inhibition have been demonstrated in endocrine,
muscular, digestive, respiratory, cardiovascular, and immune functions. As one
example, in studies of delayed muscle tension recovery following stress, the role of
emotional inhibition in prolonging physiological activation was affirmed. In one study
involving a sample of 42 adult males, reductions in autonomic activation and muscle
tension were considered an adaptive relaxation response after relief from a stressor.
As predicted, emotional inhibition was negatively related to changes in physiological
activation - repressive coping styles predicted less reductions in such indices,
indicating a physiological cost of inhibiting feelings (Kaiser, 1995). In considering the
potential physiological systems involved, the endocrine system is one prominent
gateway as emotions trigger the release of pituitary and adrenal hormones with
manifold effects including alterations in immune and cardiovascular function
(Rozanzki et al,1999). Negative emotional states can activate the sympathetic-
pituitary-adrenal medullary axis and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis.
Rabin (1999) has reported on numerous studies suggesting that a variety of emotion
responsive hormones such as adrenaline and noradrenaline, adrenocorticotropin
honnone, and Cortisol can evoke changes in immune function with reciprocal
influences on endocrine systems. Depression, for example, can cause elevations in
Cortisol with consequent adverse immunological changes.eg. defects in vaccine
responses (Vedhara et al, 1999). Further, Roger (1997) found that Cortisol secretions
during stress were moderately correlated with emotional inhibition (with an even
stronger association with rumination). Consistent with Pennebaker's theory of
inhibition and disease, such evidence is corroborative of the conceptualisation of
emotional inhibition as a low level cumulative stressor with psychophysiological
correlates. The involvement of the endocrine system in many stress related conditions
is probably mediated in part by changes in hormonal levels associated with the
physiological work relating to emotional inhibition. Moreover, the relative inability to
successfully unwind after stressful episodes (reflected in a propensity for excessive
rumination) may be reflected in a slower return to neuroendocrine baseline levels
(Frankenhaeuser, 1986).
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One study, investigating the potential health benefits of emotional disclosure in
diabetes patients ( i.e. focussed writing about stressful experiences over four
consecutive days), found significantly fewer incidences of physical illness and less
depressive symptoms in the experimental group compared with controls.
Interestingly, there was no demonstrable effect of disclosure on mean self-recorded
blood sugar levels or HbAlc scores (Bodor, 2004). However, the sample was small
(twenty two participants), and the study did not address the issue of individual
differences in stress reactivity. It is possible that individuals with a higher loading on
emotional inhibitory tendencies may have derived more of a 'release' from focussed
disclosure with corresponding benefits in physical health and metabolic control.
Recent challenges to the Inhibition model point to improved health benefits ofwritten
disclosure about past, ongoing and upcoming events (Smyth, 1998), calling into
question whether prior nondisclosure of a specific stressful experience is necessary or
sufficient for effective disclosure. Rather, a general tendency to suppress feelings may
result in emotional dysregulation of a sort that impacts negatively on physiology and
health. Unexpressed painful emotional states may maintain the disturbing
physiological correlates at a heightened level of intensity. Disclosure, on the other
hand, if repeated overtime, can result in a habituation effect - progressive reductions
in physiological indices and subjective feeling states over time. Differences in the
propensity for emotional disclosure may thus need to be considered in studies
concerning the psychophysiological effects of emotional inhibition.
1.7. Stress Reactivity and Glycaemic Control
While stress has been indirectly linked to poor metabolic control through its
interference with self care behaviours, changes in glucose control may also be
mediated through more direct physiological mechanisms implicated in stress
reactivity (Bradley, 1998).
With indirect mediation, stress can effect changes in behaviour patterns which, in
turn, may disrupt self-care behaviours (Barglow et at, 1984). For example, those who
are prone to 'hurry sickness' (type A characteristics) may find the tasks of blood
glucose monitoring and investing time in preparing well balanced meals inconvenient
or irritating. This lack of prioritisation afforded to such 'incidental' behaviours could
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understandably, disrupt metabolic controls. With direct physiological mediation,
stress induced alterations occur in sympathetic and pituitary activity (increases in
catabolic honnone levels and decreases of anabolic hormones). Increases in blood
glucose levels may, in many cases, occur in people with diabetes due to this
psychophysiological mediation pathway. Reductions in blood glucose levels have,
however, been known to occur in a smaller minority.
1.7.1. Stress Reactivity and Glycaemic Control: Individual Differences
Experimental studies of stress and blood glucose control have revealed contradictory
results. For example, Edwards et al. (1985) reported an absence of significant changes
in blood glucose control in response to stressful activities (e.g. mental arithmetic and
public speaking). Greenhalgh et al. (1992) researched the effects of specific stressors
on changes in blood flow at injection site. The mean levels of blood glucose
increased in some patients but reduced in others under acute stress conditions. Such
studies strongly indicate the importance of individual differences when attempting to
understand the relationship between stress and blood sugar levels.
A potentially important mediating variable is the stress responsiveness of individual
patients recruited in such studies. In general, although the pattern of research to date
suggests that increased daily stress will have a significant positive relationship with
blood sugar levels in both IDDM (Hansen & Pritchard, 1986) and NIDDM (Goetsch,
Abel & Cope, 1994), scrutiny of subjects blood glucose response to stress highlights
that some people are more stress reactive than others. For example, in one study
(Halford et al, 1990), only half the sample of 15 participants had significant
associations between stress and blood glucose levels. Stress had a significant effect on
blood glucose levels for each of the 7 subjects after the effects of diet, exercise and
insulin administration were partialled out. With regard to those individuals deemed to
be stress reactive, general research findings indicate that the majority show an
increase in blood glucose levels under stress with a significant minority showing a
decrease in blood glucose levels. As an example, Aikens et al (1994), in a study of 25
women with IDDM whose daily stress and blood glucose levels were monitored over
30 consecutive days, found blood glucose to be higher on high stress days than on low
stress days, with a third of the sample demonstrating significant positive associations
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between stress and same-day glucose. Riazi et al (1996) identified strong individual
differences in blood glucose stress reactivity. In 13 of the 54 subjects , blood glucose
levels were significantly associated with daily stress levels. Moreover, those who
evidenced strong correlations between stress and same day glucose also had higher
HbAlc levels. Stress was also related to next day blood sugar levels in 8 participants,
suggesting that the effects of stress may be prolonged. Similarly, research by Kramer
et al (2000) suggested that the strength and direction of the association between stress
and blood glucose control shows substantive variation between individuals. Further,
Anderson & Kris (2003) found that, when exposed to psychosocial stressors, a
loading on trait negative affectivity predicted short term blood glucose and HbAlc but
only in a small number of individuals.
Such findings reveal the limitation of previous research studies which relied on
analysis of group differences or which adopted individual measures ofblood glucose.
The concept of individual difference as a moderator variable has been replicated
repeatedly in more recent research, as reported above, in increasing our understanding
of the relationship between stress and blood sugar levels. On the ground, this
typically translates, for an individual patient, into "trial and error" learning as to how
their blood sugar levels respond to different types of stress (as stated earlier, while
increases in blood sugar levels are the most common form of stress reactivity,
decreases are not uncommon).
The concept of individual difference also receives indirect corroboration from studies
investigating the effectiveness of stress management techniques for individuals to aid
diabetes management. In short, research indicates that such methods may be useful
for some people but not others. The evidence tends to suggest that relaxation training
is most valuable for those individuals who, in addition to having poorly controlled
diabetes, also felt that stress disrupted their diabetes control and were concurrently
experiencing stressful events (Bradley et al, 1985). The general pattern emerging
from such studies is that those who either show stress-induced disturbance ofblood
glucose control or who are anxious and autonomically reactive benefit most.
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I.7.3. Psychophysiological Mediation ofStress:
Implicationsfor Metabolic Control
As reported above, being in a state of heightened autonomic arousal has been shown
to affect blood sugar levels. A predisposition toward stress-induced physiological
reactivity coupled with delayed recovery from such autonomic arousal are
characteristic features of stress reactivity. As earlier reported, emotional detachment
has been shown to be negatively correlated with deteriorating health status following
exposure to stress (Roger, 1995). Moreover, the tendency toward emotional
rumination (thinking about upsetting events after they have occurred) and, to a lesser
extent, emotional inhibition, have been shown to relate directly to delayed
physiological recovery following stress (Roger, 1998). Tendencies toward emotional
rumination and inhibition thus appear to be centrally involved in stress reactivity.
However, Type A behaviour, a personality variable, has also been implicated in stress
reactivity.
Birks & Roger (2000), in their efforts to develop a measure of the Type A behaviour
pattern, identified high achievement motivation, hostile competitiveness, and
impatience as the core ingredients which reflected the more toxic aspects of the Type
A behaviour patterns identified to date. Type A individuals are known to show higher
levels of arousal under stress and often to seek out more stressful situations than Type
B individuals. In trying to understand the critical component that most strongly
predicts cardiac illness, research has, in recent times, pointed to the hostility
component as being strongly implicated (Krantz & McCeney, 2002). As an example,
in a study of attentional bias (Faunce et al, 2004), anger/hostility words were the only
words to selectively attract the attention of type A individuals. They hypthesized that
anger/hostility/aggression may be at a higher baseline in type A subjects which, when
it finds expression in competitive situations, may be temporarily satiated (the
attentional bias was present under low performance motivation conditions, but
disappeared under high performance conditions). Considering the conventional
wisdom that type A subjects are characterized by dysfunctional themes concerning
competitiveness, achievement, and impatience, Helmers & Krantz (1996) possibly
resolve this apparent contradiction between theory and research in their construct of
defensive hostility which implies an unconscious perception of the threat of being
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subordinated in a competitive situation. The hostile substrate may thus constitute a
primed state as preparation for warding off any potential threats in the
achievement/social advancement domain. Thus, anticipatory anxiety over loss of the
self image may be the natural state in Type As'. Defensive anger, which reflects deep
anxieties, can thus be considered an emotional 'hair trigger' mechanism designed to
anticipate and defuse threats to ones self esteem. Helmers & Krantz (1996), in their
investigation of the relationships among hostility, defensiveness, and cardiovascular
responses to stress in 67 healthy subjects, found defensive hostility to be differentially
related to cardiovascular responses in men and women. Their data suggested that the
trait of defensive hostility (characterized by a hostile cynical view of the world and
the need to be viewed positively by others despite this negative attitudinal set) may
demonstrate associations with blood pressure levels and coronary disease in research
studies where such associations are not apparent when employing measures of
hostility alone.
According to Svebak (1992), the predictive value ofType A behaviour associates the
performance component with competitiveness and the hostility-impatience component
with physiological reactivity. Researching this domain of psychophysiological
reactivity, Surwit et al (2002) examined the relationship of hostility (Cook-Medley
hostility scale) to various parameters of glucose metabolism in a young, healthy
sample (n=98) ofAfrican-American and Caucasian subjects. In the entire sample,
hostility was found to be significantly correlated with fasting glucose readings and
insulin sensitivity. Type A's may thus "carry" more inner physiological arousal on a
consistent basis (emotional rumination has been linked to heightened stress reactivity
i.e. intense physiological activation coupled with prolonged recovery period). Glynn
et al, (2002) have shown that continued rumination about an angering situation
intensifies and renders more frequent the anger experience which, in turn, results in an
exacerbation of the negative consequences of anger, such as the prolonging of
cardiovascular responses to the situation in question. Thus, the ruminative process
may operate as a maintaining factor - prolonging the inner physiological reaction to a
perceived stressful event that has since passed, or, indeed, is expected to occur in the
future (anticipatory anxiety may also be a feature).
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In the case of diabetes, any proneness to greater autonomic reactivity could play a
moderator role between general life stress and blood sugar control. Stabler et al
(1986), for example, found that type A children with type 1 diabetes demonstrated
elevated blood sugar levels after playing a stressful video game whereas Type B
children with the same condition showed a reduction in blood sugar levels. The Type
A behaviour constellation may thus be one such moderator variable which could help
explain blood sugar fluctuations in those with diabetes. A characteristic feature of
Type A individuals compared with perfectionistic tendencies not associated with Type
A characteristics is the generalised compulsive, arousal inducing behavioural pattern
(rushing/racing/driven ambition) with an associated affective charge (hostile
substrate). In other words, such moderating effects may result from a direct
psychophysiological pathway (increased output of stress hormones) in combination
with a more indirect behavioural pathway (time urgency undermining investment in
self care tasks in diabetes).
Taken together, separate lines of research have implicated emotional rumination,
emotional inhibition, and Type A behaviour as psychosocial variables which directly
mediate changes in the body's stress-physiological systems. Bearing in mind
individual differences in susceptibility to stress induced fluctuations in glycaemic
control, these psychosocial variables merit investigation as potential mediators of
metabolic control.
1.8. Rationale
The current research draws together separate lines of psychological enquiry to
determine both the nature of the interrelationships of the psychosocial variables
posited and their relative contribution to discrete outcomes in diabetes. The
examination of the relationships between inner cognitive structures (mastery
strivings), illness appraisals, emotional regulation processes, and health outcomes in
diabetes is important in terms of understanding the broader person environment
interaction more fully. It is anticipated that illness beliefs will serve to mediate the
effects ofmore generic personality-based structures and processes on diabetes
outcomes; that personality structures will variably influence outcomes depending on
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their character; and that certain physiologically reactive psychological processes can
directly mediate changes in blood sugar levels.
1.8.1. Hypotheses
The following hypotheses, formulated in line with theoretical speculations included in
the literature review, will be tested in the present study:
(i) A relationship between emotional regulation processes and diabetes
distress will be mediated by illness beliefs.
(ii) Healthy mastery will be negatively associated with diabetes distress.
(iii) Compulsive mastery will be positively associated with diabetes distress.
(iv) A relationship between mastery strivings and diabetes distress will be
mediated by illness beliefs.
(v) Healthy mastery will be positively associated with self care behaviours
(vi) Compulsive mastery will be negatively associated with self care
behaviours
(vii) A relationship between mastery strivings and self care behaviour will be
mediated by illness beliefs.
(viii) Psychophysiological variables (rumination, inhibition, Type A) will
contribute to variance in blood sugar levels after controlling for self care






The sample was recruited from adult diabetic patients in a local district hospital in
Northern Ireland. Eligibility criteria were: having a diagnosis of type 1 or type 2
diabetes of at least 12 months duration, and being responsible for one's own diabetes
self care. In the statistical analysis, the sample size varied from 94 to 96 across the
individual measures employed.
2.2. Procedure
Research participation was initially sought by a diabetes nurse specialist when
patients were attending for their scheduled appointment at the diabetes hospital
outpatients clinic. Those patients who agreed to participate subsequently met with the
researcher who explained the purpose of the study and stressed the confidentiality of
data obtained. After obtaining informed written consent and demographic details, all
participating subjects were fully acquainted with the questionnaires to ensure that test
instructions were understood. They were asked to complete the questionnaires in their
own time at home and to return them in the stamped addressed envelope provided.
Follow up telephone contact was made with those participants who failed to return
their completed questionnaires within 3 weeks. To enable candid responding, code
numbers rather than names were used on the questionnaires. The participants
glycosylated haemoglobin scores at the time of their clinic visit and at 6 month follow
up were also obtained from hospital records with the patients written consent.
Of the 106 patients who agreed to participate, 10 neglected to return their completed
questionnaires despite follow-up telephone contact.There was no significant
difference between 'completers' and 'noncompleters' on the continuous demographic
variables of age, duration of diabetes, and years in education (t-test). Of the
categorical demographic variables, there was no significant difference between the
two groups in marital status, living circumstances, medical complications, diabetes
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type and insulin dependence; however, there were significantly more males and
employed people among noncompleters relative to completers (chi-square test).
2.3, Measures
i) Personal Models of Diabetes Questionnaire (Hampsen et al, 2000).The
assessment of personal models has evolved over time from a lengthy interview
(Hampsen et al, 1990) to a short questionnaire (Glasgow, Hampsen, Striker &
Ruggiero, 1997).The brief questionnaire used in this study was composed of 7 items
concerning diabetes and its general management in addition to 10 regimen area
specific questions. A 5 point Likert scale (l=not at all through to 5=extremely) was
used for all items. The respondent's scores on the three variables (perceived
seriousness of their diabetes, perceived effectiveness of treatment, perceived control
over one's diabetes) were obtained by computing the mean rating of the component
items.
In assessing perceived seriousness of their diabetes, the mean of three items was
computed ("how serious is your diabetes", "how worried are you about developing
complications of diabetes", "how much has having diabetes changed your activities").
Perceptions of treatment effectiveness were similarly assessed by obtaining the mean
of three items. Two items reflected beliefs about the general importance of following
the treatment regimen ("how important is following your self-care recommendations
for controlling your diabetes" and "how important is controlling your glucose level
for avoiding complications from diabetes"). The third component was composed of
10 regimen specific questions for which a mean was computed (exercising regularly,
not smoking, testing blood glucose regularly, recording blood glucose results
regularly, checking your feet regularly, following a low fat/high fibre eating plan, not
eating many sweets, drinking little or no alcohol, managing sick days as
recommended, and, making sure you get regular medical tests for diabetes related
problems). Each one of the 10 regimen areas were rated on a 5 point Likert scale for
the importance of controlling diabetes (from, "probably not important" to "very
important"). A similar 5 point Likert scale was also used to rate the various regimen
areas for their degree of helpfulness in preventing complications of diabetes (from
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"probably not likely to help me" to "very likely to help me"). The two ratings
obtained for each regimen area were averaged, the mean of all averages obtained was
computed and then added to the two general important items to obtain an overall
perceived treatment effectiveness score (as stated above, the overall score for this
construct was the mean of the three values obtained).
Perceived control over one's diabetes was assessed by two items, again, with a 5
point Likert scale ("how much control you feel you have over your blood glucose
levels" and "how frustrated do you feel when trying to take care of your diabetes").
Previous studies (Hampsen et al, 2000) demonstrated acceptable internal reliability
for the scales notwithstanding the small number of items in each scale ( seriousness 3
items, a=.57; treatment effectiveness 3 items, a=.74; control, 2 items, a=.53).
Evidence for the validity and internal reliability of the questionnaire was originally
based on a study of 2000 adults with diabetes (Glasgow et al, 1997) which
demonstrated that the personal model scales had good internal consistency and
predicted variance in domains of self care behaviour.
ii) Multi-Dimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost et al, 1990).The MPS is a 35 item
questionnaire which was devised to assess perfectionism. The scale is composed of 6
subscales which were scored by summing the items. In addition, there is an overall
perfectionism score which is the sum of all the subscales except the organization
subscale. The 6 subscales measure specific aspects of perfectionism - 1) concern over
mistakes, 2) personal standards,3) parental expectations, 4) parental criticism, 5)
doubts about actions, and 6) organization". The Concern Over Mistakes subscale
reflects negative reactions to mistakes eg. attempting to interpret mistakes as
equivalent to failure, having a tendency to believe that one would lose respect of
others following failure etc. The Personal Standards subscale is concerned with the
setting of very high or demanding standards and the importance attached to these
standards for self-evaluation. The Parent Expectation scale measures a tendency to
perceive that one's parents set very high goals while the Parental Criticism scale
reflects a perception that one's parents were (or continue to be) highly critical. The
Doubting ofActions subscale measures the degree to which individuals lack
confidence in their ability to accomplish tasks. The Organization subscale measures
a tendency to be orderly or organized, and reflects a concern with order or orderliness.
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Although it is often associated with perfectionism, the overall perfectionism score
does not include the organization subscale score as it was found to be only loosely
related to the other scales. Examples of subscale items are as follows:
CM subscale: "I should be upset if I make a mistake."
PS subscale: "If I do not set high standards for myself, I am likely to end up a second
rate person."
PE subscale: "My parents set very high standards for me."
PC subscale: "As a child I was punished for being less than perfect"
DoA subscale:"Even if I do something very carefully, I often feel that it is not quite
right"
O Subscale:"I try to be an organized person"
The scale has good internal consistency with values for the various subscales ranging
from .88 to .93 (overall perfectionism measure = .9).The six scales are highly
intercorrelated but, as already stated, the organization scale demonstrated the weakest
pattern of intercorrelation with the other subscales and with the total perfectionism
score as a whole. The MPS demonstrates high correlations with other measures of
perfectionism, in particular, the Self-Oriented Perfectionism and Socially Prescribed
Perfectionism Scales on the Multidimensional Perfectionism scale (Hewitt & Fletts,
1991), the Perfectionism Scale from the Eating Disorder Inventory (Garner et al,
1983), the Self-Evaluative Scale from the IBT (Jones, 1968), and the Burns
Perfectionism Scale (Burns, 1980).
iii) The Framinghani Type A Behaviour Pattern Scale (Haynes et al, 1978)
This TAB measure contains 10 items which relate to 3 types of question (i) traits and
qualities which characterize the respondent (5 items); (ii) how the respondent feels at
the end of an average day (4 items); and (iii) whether the respondent gets upset at
having to wait for anything (1 item). Regarding section (ii) of the TAB measure
(questions 6-9), work-related questions related to housework for those who were not
formally employed; otherwise, the questions concerned the respondent's formal
employment. Total administration time for the Framingham Type A scale was about 5
minutes.
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The process of item selection involved a panel of three experts choosing items from a
larger set of items which were considered Type A behaviour patterns. The selected
items were subjected to item and factor analysis, with items dropped if factor loadings
were low or inter-item correlations were <0.15. Items were also excluded which had a
correlation co-efficient of <0.25 with the total test score. The scoring system is as
follows: Section 1: very well = 1, fairly well = 0.67, somewhat = 0.33, not at all = 0.
Section 2 and 3: yes = 1, no = 0.Total scores are obtained by adding the scores for the
responses and dividing by a number of items (10). For all items, responses range
from 0-1, with equal intervals between the range of responses for each item in
section 1.
The internal consistency of the TAB scale, based on the average correlation between
scale items was 0.71 and 0.70 in a sample of 809 men and 1013 women respectively.
Some support for the construct validity of the TAB comes from data presented by
Haynes (1978,1980). The TAB scale correlated with the anger subscales of the
Framingham Anger measure; it also demonstrated correlations over 0.3 with measures
of daily stress, tension, personal worries, ambitiousness, and emotional lability.
However, the greatest evidence of validity of the TAB measure arises from the ability
to predict coronary heart disease (Haynes et al, 1980) independent of other risk
factors. TAB is characterised by time urgency, hostility, hard driving competitiveness
and irritability. Although brief, the Framingham scale has been found to be predictive
ofCHD.
iv) The Revised Emotional Control Questionnaire - ECQ4 (Roger et al,
2000).This is a 39 item measure which assesses a tendency towards emotional
rumination and inhibition. It has been extensively validated, including confirmatory
factor analysis. Emotional ruminations and emotional inhibition have been shown to
be significantly related to a variety of health related physiological responses to stress
including heart rate recovery, blood pressure, and Cortisol secretion.
The authors define the concept of emotional control as the tendency to inhibit the
expression of emotional responses and postulated that it may predispose individuals to
stress related conditions by inhibiting recovery from the autonomic arousal
associated with emotion. The ECQ was developed to explore individual differences
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in stress responses; indeed various studies have investigated the relationship between
the ECQ and physiological reactivity and recovery. Research studies indicate that
emotional control, in particular the tendency to mentally rehearse emotional events,
may be a critical factor in prolonging physiological recovery from stress. A number of
personality factors have been proposed as moderating variables linking stress and
disease; confirmatory results have emerged for emotional coping strategies such as
inhibition and rumination.
The original emotional control questionnaire constructed and validated by Roger &
Nesshoever (1987) contained a 4 factor structure comprising rehearsal, emotional
inhibition, aggression control and benign control. However, a disadvantage of the
original scale is its brevity. A limited range of behaviours set up by the scale,
particularly the emotional inhibition and benign control factors may have served to
reduce the size of the correlations with other questionnaire behavioural variables.
Roger & Najarian (1989) expanded the original ECQ to include a wider set of
behaviours and provided evidence for the validity and reliability of the new scale.
The four factors derived in the analysis of the ECQ2 were similar to those obtained in
the earlier ECQ scale (the ECQ2 contained many of the items in the ECQ). However,
the revised ECQ2 involved the clarification of the structured variable factors and the
expanded rehearsal, emotional inhibition, benign control and aggression control scales
address the much wider sampling of the range of behaviours involved in emotional
control.
The new factors had good internal consistency and stability over the test/retest
intervals. Regarding internal consistency, reliability co-efficients were substantial
and satisfactory (e.g. rehearsal: 0.86; emotional inhibition: 0.77). Test/re-test
reliability was assessed over a 7 week interval (sample of 86 undergraduate students)
giving rise to substantial co-efficients (rehearsal: 0.80; emotional inhibition: 0.79).
Concurrent validation data derived from comparison with existing scales. For
example, rehearsal significantly correlated with trait anxiety (r=0.24) on the State
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, 1970), the rehearsal factor correlated significantly
with the neuroticism dimension of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire(r=0.57),
while emotional inhibition was significantly correlated (r=0.37) with the extraversion
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dimension of the EPQ. On the Paulhus Spheres ofControl measure of locus control,
the interpersonal control dimension was negatively correlated with inhibition
(r=-0.56) and rehearsal/rumination (r=-0.37)
Due to their importance as moderator variables in research linking stress and illness,
Roger, Guarino & Olason (2000) expanded the ECQ rumination (rehearsal) and
inhibition scales. Confirmatory factor analysis established the structure of the new
scales. Rumination measures the tendency to continue thinking about distressing
events after they have occurred and, in association with emotional inhibition, has been
found to play a significant role in prolonging physiological recovery following stress
(Roger & Jameson, 1988; Roger & Najarian, 1998). Research evidence suggests that
rumination has been centrally responsible for changes in health status during
adaptation. Inhibition was also implicated but to a lesser extent.
On the most recently revised ECQ (ECQ4),19 items measure rumination and 21 items
measure inhibition. Items are marked true or false (and scored 1 and 0 respectively).
As already stated, rumination measures the tendency to continue thinking about
emotionally upsetting events after they have occurred. Test items include: "I
remember things that upset me or make me angry for a long time afterwards"; "I get
worked up just thinking about things I have said in the past"; "I often find myself
thinking over and over about things that make me angry".
Emotional inhibition reflects a tendency to experience inner conflict around
expression/disclosure of feelings. Test items include "when someone upsets me, I try
to hide my feelings"; "If I receive bad news in front of other, I usually try to hide how
1 feel"; "I seldom show how 1 feel about things".
The scoring system allocates 1 point for 14 items marked true and 8 items marked
false on the Inhibition scale. On the Rumination scale, 1 point is awarded for 12 items
marked true and 6 items marked false.
v) The Revised Coping Styles Questionnaire - CSQ3 (Roger, 1996). This was
initially a 60 item scale for measuring coping strategies. While previous studies had
suggested that there were three primary components in coping, namely task, emotion,
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and avoidance, the validation of the CSQ confirmed these results while, in addition,
uncovering a new factor, termed distancing or detachment. The CSQ yielded scales
for rational coping, emotional coping, avoidance coping, and detachment (new
factor). Detachment refers to the feeling ofbeing independent of a stressful event and
any emotions associated with it. This fourth detachment scale has since been merged
with emotional coping to form a single scale (labelled detachment).
There was high overall internal consistency with the CSQ in the construction/
validation of the scale, with satisfactory coefficient alphas obtained for each of the
four factors separately: rational coping 0.853, detached coping 0.897, emotional
coping 0.735, and avoidance coping 0.690. The mean item intercorrelations were
within the optimum range suggested by Briggs & Cheek (1986). They ranged from
0.232 for avoidance coping to 0.388 for rational coping. Following an inter-test
interval of 3 months, the CSQ was returned by 116 out of a student sample of 154.
Re-test coefficients were 0.801 for rational coping, 0.794 for detached coping, 0.766
for emotional coping and 0.701 for avoidance coping.
Scores on CSQ were correlated with scores on the ECQ (Roger & Najarian, 1989) as
part of a concurrent validation exercise. A consistent pattern of results was reflected
in the analysis, with a tendency to ruminate on distressing events (ECQ rumination)
showing positive significant correlations with both of the maladaptive CSQ scales and
significant negative correlations with both of the adaptive scales. Benign control
(ECQ), a measure of impulsiveness, demonstrated significant correlations with three
of the coping styles - rational (-), detached (-), and emotional coping (+). The analysis
suggested that impulsives tend to use more emotional and less rational and/or
detached coping styles. Emotional inhibition (ECQ) had a positive significant
association with avoidance coping but not with the other remaining scales. Similarly,
there were no significant correlations between CSQ factors and the aggression control
(ECQ).
In the present study, the key variable of interest is the rational coping style subscale of
the CSQ in view of it's positive mastery connotation (in contrast to the more negative
mastery connotation associated with perfectionism and Type A behaviour). As
detachment has been found to correlate highly with emotional rumination, it was not
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included as a variable of interest in the present study. Rational coping is assessed with
such items as "when stressed 1 try to find out more information to help make a
decision about things", "when stressed I take action to change things"; "when stressed
I use my past experience to try to deal with the situation" etc. A 4 point Likert scale
scoring system was employed (always = 3, often = 2, sometimes = 1, never = 0) and
scores range from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of up to 23. This revised version
(CSQ3) of the original CSQ has 41 items.
vi) The Summary of Diabetes Self-Care Activities Scale - Revised (Toobert et al,
2000). This is a brief self-report instrument for assessing degrees of self-care
behaviour across the self care aspects of the diabetes regimen: general diet, specific
diet, exercise, blood glucose testing, foot care and smoking. In view of the number of
studies using this measure in previous research (one of which included a survey of
more than 2000 people with diabetes), the STSCA is more than likely the most
frequently used self-report instrument for measuring diabetes self-care in adults. As
the measure had undergone various modifications over the years, Toobert (2000)
reviewed these developments and provided a new revised version based on findings
from previous studies. The reliability, validity, and normative data from 7 different
studies, involving 1988 people with diabetes, were reviewed and resulted in an
updated version of the summary of diabetes self-care activities measure. The
participants in the seven studies were mainly older adults, with a large majority
having Type 2 diabetes for some years. Average diabetes duration ranged from 6.3 to
13 years with the mean age of the seven samples ranging from 45 to 67 years of age.
The means for each subscale show considerable consistency across studies: patients
typically reported higher levels of dietary than exercise self-care, with the highest
levels reported for medication and blood glucose testing.
The internal consistency of the scales (average inter-item correlations) was
satisfactory (mean = 0.47); the exception to this was specific diet which was
consistently unreliable (r=0.07 to 0.23). Test retest correlations over 3 months were
significant in all but 3 studies: the magnitude of correlations tended to be moderate
however (mean r=0.40; r=-0.05 for medications to 0.78 for blood glucose
monitoring). In keeping with previous research, correlations among the STACA
scales assessing different self-care behaviours in the study were generally low.
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The validity of the STACA subscales was indicated by correlations (mean = 0.23)
with other measures of diet and exercise. Criterion variables for dietary comparisons
included food records, food frequency questionnaires, and food habit questionnaires.
For exercise, criterion variables included attendance at exercise classes, exercise self-
monitoring data, and a physical activity scale for the elderly. All correlations were
significant. Across various studies, sensitivity to change results varied widely.
Analysis of pre-to-post change among intervention conditions indicated significant
improvement in six of nine comparisons conditions on the STACA. With this
updated information, a revised version of the STACA was developed along with a
new scoring method.
This revised version consists of a core set of 11 items (used in previous studies)
combined with an expanded list of 14 additional questions of potential use to
clinicians/researchers. In the new version, the scoring is simplified and the best items
are retained. Criteria for retaining items in this new version included (a) consistency
in mean values across studies, (b) sufficient variability (c) stability over time (d)
internal consistency (e) predictability (t) sensitivity to change (g) ease of scoring and
(h) ease of interpretation. Moreover, in the revised version, questions on medication
taking are not included because of strong ceiling effects and lack of variability.
Moreover, the poor internal consistency of the specific diet scale results in a
recommendation that it not be included in the scale despite its moderate to high
validity. Finally, the scoring interpretation of the revised STACA scale was
simplified by using days of the week instead of percentages.
Examples of self-care items on the new scale include the following: diet, "how many
of the last 7 days have you followed a healthy eating plan", score range 0-7; exercise:
"how many of the last 7 days did you participate in at least 30 minutes of physical
activity (total minutes of each activity including walking)" score range 0-7; blood
sugar testing: "how many of the last 7 days did you test your blood sugar" score range
vii) The Problem Areas in Diabetes Scale (Polonsky et al, 1995). This is a 20 item
instrument which assesses diabetes related emotional distress. Each item reflects an
0-7.
area of psychological distress unique to life with diabetes. For example, specific
feeling states range from intense frustration with aspects of the diabetes regimen
(feeling burned out by the constant effort to manage diabetes) to fear (feeling scared
when you think about having and living with diabetes).Items are rated on a 5 point
Likert scale reflecting the extent to which an item is perceived as problematic. A total
score is computed by summing the total item responses. Raw scores are converted to a
0-100 scale to make them more easy to work with and understand (i.e. the total
obtained for all 20 items is multiplied by 1.25 to provide a score range from 0-100).
The PAID is a valid and reliable instrument for assessing diabetes related emotional
distress. In separate studies, the authors found the internal reliability of the PAID to
be high (Cronbach's alpha = 0.95). The items total correlations were also very
satisfactory, ranging from 0.32 to 0.84 (mean 0.67). In addition, in the same studies, a
number of significant correlations between the PAID and criterion variables strongly
supports the hypothesis that this instrument is tapping into the core concept of
diabetes related emotional distress. Regarding concurrent validity, the PAID was
positively correlated with relevant psychosocial measures i.e. general emotional
distress (The Brief Symptom Inventory), eating pattern (Bulimia Test - Revised), fear
of hypoglycaemia (Hypoglycaemia Fear Survey), short and long term complications,
and glycaemic control (r=0.30, t <.0005). PAID scores were found to be negatively
associated, however, with reported self-care behaviours (the Self-Care Inventory) in
contrast to the positive association with HbAl c scores.
Polonsky & Welch (1996) conducted two studies using the PAID (involving 451 and
257 subjects respectively with either IDDM and N1DDM). Data from the studies
combined with its use in clinical work indicated that diabetes related distress is
common, with approx. 60% of the subjects in both studies reporting at least one
serious problem area (mean PAID score was 54.5; SD=23.1). Worrying about future
complications and feelings of guilt or anxiety when 'getting off track' with diabetes
management were the most strongly endorsed items. Moreover, diabetes related
distress was directly associated with both self care behaviours and long term
glycaemic control, after controlling for general emotional distress. That is to say, the
specific feelings and frustrations evoked by the daily demands of life with diabetes
may directly impact on self care behaviour and blood glucose control, and, as such,
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merit a therapeutic focus in their own right. In this regard, the PAID has been found to
be a useful instrument for both stimulating emotionally relevant conversations with
patients and for planning, directing and evaluating treatment interventions.
viii) Metabolic Control was determined by measuring glycosylated haemoglobin
levels (HbAlc). These values reflect the average blood glucose over the preceding 3





3. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Data analyses were conducted with SPSS Version 12. Descriptive statistics were
computed for all respondents. Bivariate correlations were calculated to highlight the
relationships between the relevant demographic and psychosocial independent
variables and outcome variables - achievement of treatment goals (diabetes emotional
related adjustment, self-care behaviour, and HbAlc scores). The bivariate
relationships were examined for multicollinearity. A series of separate hierarchical
regression analyses was undertaken to determine the predictors (demographic and
psychosocial) of the relevant outcome variables (emotional adjustment, self-care
behaviour, blood sugar levels). The collection ofHbAlc values at baseline and 6
months follow-up will allow cross sectional and longitudinal comparisons. Given the
number of statistical tests conducted, there is the possibility that the Type 1 error rate
may be inflated at times. Consequently, effect sizes (correlation coefficients and beta
values) were relied on to aid interpretation.
Multivariate outliers were checked by inspecting the Mahalanobis distances generated
by the multiple regression program. Data assumptions were also checked by a visual
inspection of the normal probability plots and residuals scatterplots of the regression
standardized residuals requested as part of the analysis. To better meet the
assumptions of a normal distribution, data were transformed for three separate
hierarchical regression analyses:
(i) when emotional regulation processes were compared with illness beliefs as
potential predictors of diabetes distress, the square root ofdistress was the
applied formula.
(ii) when mastery strivings were compared with illness beliefs as potential
predictors of diabetes distress, the square root ofdistress was applied.
(iii) when mastery strivings were compared with illness beliefs for their




A total of 106 eligible adults agreed to participate of whom 96 returned their
completed questionnaires. Nonparticipants (n= 10) differed significantly from
participants only on gender (nonparticipants: 9 men, 1 woman, p< .05) and
employment status (nonparticipants: 7 employed, 3 unemployed, p< .05).
Of those who participated in the study (n=96), 40 were women (42%) and 56 were
men (58%).The mean age of participants was 57 years (+ - 12.01). The majority of
respondents (81 %) were married or living with a partner. In all, 83% of the sample
were living with a family member (17% lived alone). The majority of the sample
(65%) were either unemployed or retired; approximately one third (35%) was
formally employed. The number of years in formal education was 12.3 (+ - 2.4). The
vast majority were educated to secondary/vocational level with a small percentage
educated to university level. 35 respondents (36%) had Type 1 diabetes; 61 (64%)
had Type 2 diabetes. However, approximately 60% of all respondents were insulin
dependent, (many Type 2 diabetics had progressed on to insulin in later years). The
mean duration of diabetes since time of diagnosis was 14.02 years (+ - 10.47). 38%
of the sample reported significant co-morbid medical conditions. Finally, "most
recent" mean HbAlc score was 8.56 (+ - 1.39) for all respondents. Follow-up mean
HbAlc score after a 6 month interval (average) was slightly lower at 8.46 (+ - 1.21).
Demographic characteristics of the sample are summarised in Table 1.
3.2. Bivariate correlations between independent and outcome variables
Initial exploratory analysis was conducted by correlating demographic and
psychosocial measures (illness beliefs, emotional regulation processes, mastery
strivings) with diabetes related distress, self-management, and blood sugar control
(most recent and 6mth follow up). Regarding the demographic variables, those who
were insulin dependent were more likely to check their blood sugar (r = -.36) and to
have higher blood sugar levels (r= -.36) at 6 month follow up. Of the psychosocial
variables, beliefs concerning the seriousness of diabetes had a moderately strong
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Table 1 Patient Characteristics ( N= 96)
Number (and percentage) of sample
















Type 1 Diabetes 35 (36%)
Type 2 Diabetes 61 (64%)
Insulin dependent 58 (60%)
Noninsulin dependent 38 (40%)
Duration of Diabetes 14.02(10.47)
Comorbidity
No comorbid conditions 59 (62%)
Comorbid medical conditions 37 (38%)
Blood Sugar Levels
Baseline HbAlc score 8.56 (1.39)










Table 2 Distribution of scores on Psychological, Behavioural and
Physiological measures




Seriousness 3.22 0.92 1 - 5
Treatment Effectiveness 4.25 0.50 1 - 5
Controllability 3.24 0.83 1-5
Emotion Regulation
Emotional Rumination 7.47 4.84 0- 18
Emotional Inhibition 9.36 5.30 0-21
Mastery Strivings
Perfectionism 71.14 19.97 29- 145
Type A 0.41 0.26 0-1
Rational Coping 15.77 5.00 0-27
Outcome Variables
Diabetes Distress
PAID 30.43 24.17 0-100
SelfCare Behaviour
General Diet 5.14 1.71 0-7
Exercise 3.09 2.27 0-7
Blood Sugar Monitoring 4.21 2.81 0-7
Blood Sugar Levels
Baseline HbAlc score 8.56 1.39
HbAlc score at 6 months 8.46 1.21
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Table 3 Summary of correlational analysis between dependent and
independent variables
Diabetes Gen. Exer. Blood Hbsc Hbsc
Distress Diet Monit Base 6 mth
Demographics
Age -.28** .19 .20* -.19 .04 -.13
Gender -.08 .07 -.01 .26* .11 .08
Diabetes duration -.08 .21* -.01 .10 -.13 -.23*
Diabetes type .01 -.07 .20* .-.25* -.02 -.11
Comorbidity .12 .12 .02 .11 .19 .28**
Employment .06 -.20* -.14 .06 -.01 .01
Married/single .04 -.10 .05 .07 27** .18
Years in Educ. .09 _ 27** -.04 .00 -.11 -.11
Non ins.dep. -.17 .02 .15 -.36** -.22* -.36**
Illness Beliefs
Seriousness .56** -.01 .06 .20 .11 .27*
Treat. Effectiveness .23* .24* .17 .36** -.11 .09
Controllability -.59** .35** .19 -.00 -28**.-.34**
Mastery Strivings
Perfectionism -.18 -.09 -.08 -.13 -.08
Type A .47** -.09 -.05 .15 -.09 .10
Rational -.26* .38** .30** .10 -.03 -.05
Emotion Regulation
Rumination .56** -.09 -.05 -.18 .00 .11
Inhibition .21* -.09 -.07 .03 -.13 -.06
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positive relationship with diabetes distress (r = .56) whereas beliefs about personal
control of diabetes had a moderately strong negative relationship with distress
(r = -.59). Of the emotion regulation processes, rumination demonstrated a moderate
to strong positive correlation with diabetes distress(r=.56). Finally, in the domain of
mastery strivings, perfectionism and Type A behaviour had a moderate positive
relationship with diabetes distress (r = .47).
The distribution of scores on psychological, behavioural, and physiological measures
is presented in Table 2. Bivariate correlations are presented in Table 3.
3.4. Regression Analysis
Using diabetes distress, self-care behaviour, and HbAlc scores as dependent
variables, a series ofhierarchical regressions was conducted with both general and
specific psychosocial measures entered, after controlling for demographic variables.
Only demographic variables which correlated at least weak to moderately (r=.20 or
greater) with the relevant outcome variable were entered at step 1.
One area for concern with the regression analyses is the number of significance tests
conducted leading to the possibility of an inflated Type I error rate. One method of
dealing with this issue is to apply a Bonferroni correction to the significance value
obtained from each test. However, this can become cumbersome to interpret and, as a
conservative approach to dealing with the problem, can inflate the Type II error rate.
The purpose of this study is to explore the nature of the relationships among the
variables under investigation. Consequently, focussing on testing null hypotheses and
the associated problems with this approach can detract from the findings. Therefore,
the interpretation of the analyses presented here focuses on the standardized
regression coefficients as an effect size statistic, thereby avoiding the problems of
interpretation based solely on hypothesis tests.
3.4.1. Diabetes Distress: Emotional Regulation Processes v Illness Beliefs
The first regression analysis examined the power of the relevant psychosocial
variables to predict diabetes related distress as measured by the PAID measure (see
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Table 4). In this hierarchical regression analysis, age was entered at step 1, with
emotion regulation processes (rumination and inhibition) and illness beliefs
(perceived control, treatment effectiveness, and seriousness) entered at later stages.
Each group of psychosocial variables made an additional contribution to variance in
diabetes distress ( emotion regulation processes r2 change = .25** ; illness beliefs r2
change = .16**).
In evaluating the contribution of each of the independent variables to the outcome
measure, age (demographics), rumination (emotion regulation process), and perceived
seriousness and control (illness beliefs) were the strongest predictors of diabetes
distress in the final model (age: beta = -.16; t = -2.05; p <.05; rumination: beta = .26;
t = 2.82; p <.01; seriousness: beta = .21; t = 2.06; p <.05; control: beta = -.34; t = -
3.66; p <.01).
3.4.1.1. Mediation Analysis
For specific illness beliefs to mediate the effects of particular emotion regulation
processes on distress, three criteria need to be met: (1) the emotion regulation
processes and illness beliefs must be related to the outcome measure; (2) there must
be a relationship between the predictor (emotional regulation process and the
mediator (illness belief); and (3) after controlling for the effects of the mediator
variable on the dependent variable, the relationship between the predictor and the
outcome should be reduced (Barron & Kenny, 1986).
Regarding the first criterion, emotional rumination, perceived seriousness and
perceived control are related to the outcome measure (see Table 4). To establish
criterion 2, illness beliefs were used as a dependent variable in a separate multiple
regression, with emotional rumination entered after controlling for demographic
variables. Rumination predicted perceived seriousness (beta = .43; t = 5.07; p <.01);
and perceived control (beta = -.39; t = -4.27 ; p <.01). Criterion 2 has thus been
fulfilled. Criterion 3 has also been established as, after controlling for the effects of
both perceived control and seriousness on diabetes distress, the relationship between
the predictor (rumination) and the outcome variable is reduced greatly. That is, the
beta weight for rumination is reduced from .49 to .26,
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Table 4 Emotional Regulation Processes v Illness Beliefs: Hierarchical
regression analysis to predict square root of diabetes related
distress (including mediation analysis)
Step Predictors Beta t Adj. R2 total R2 change
1 Demographics .11** .12**
Age -.34** -3.5








Perc. Serious .21* 2.06
Perc.Effect. .03 .30
Perc Control . 34** -3.66
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also reflected in a similar change in the T value, from 5.49 to 2.82. (After controlling
for the effects of perceived control alone, the beta weight for rumination is reduced
from .49 to .32; after controlling for the effects of perceived seriousness alone, the
beta weight for rumination is reduced from .49 to .34). This mediation analysis thus
suggests that illness beliefs (control and seriousness) partially mediate the link
between emotional rumination and diabetes distress,
3.4.2. Diabetes Distress: Mastery Strivings v Illness Beliefs
A hierarchical regression analysis was undertaken to determine the relative
contribution ofmastery strivings and illness beliefs to variance in diabetes related
distress (see Table 5). After controlling for age, mastery striving variables
(perfectionism, Type A, rational coping) were entered initially followed by illness
beliefs (seriousness, treatment effectiveness, control).Each group ofpsychosocial
variables made an additional contribution to variance in diabetes distress
( mastery strivings r2 change = .29** ; illness beliefs r2 change = .19**).
Of the mastery striving variables, perfectionism was found to be a the best predictor
of diabetes distress in the final model (beta = .33; t= 4.33; p <.01). Of the illness
beliefs, perceived seriousness and perceived control were the strongest predictors of
the outcome variable in the final model (seriousness: beta = .26; t=2.85; p <.01;
perceived control: beta = -.33; t=-3.50; p <.01).
Further analysis was undertaken to examine the possibility that specific illness beliefs
serve to mediate the relationship between mastery striving variables and diabetes
distress. Regarding the three necessary criteria for a mediation role:
(1) Mastery striving variables (perfectionism, type A, rational coping) are related
to the outcome measure (diabetes distress) at step 2; illness beliefs (seriousness and
control) also predict the outcome variable at step 3 (see table 5);
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Table 5 Mastery schemas v Illness Beliefs: Hierarchical regression analysis
to predict square root of diabetes related distress (including
mediation analysis)
Step Predictors Beta t Adj. R2 total R2 change














Perc Control -.33** -3.45
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(2) A separate regression analysis demonstrated a relationship between the
predictor variables (mastery strivings) and the mediator (illness beliefs): that is, type
A predicted perceived control (beta = -.27; t = -2.70; p< .01); rational coping
predicted perceived control (beta = .39; t= 4.22; p< ,01);and type A predicted
perceived seriousness (beta = .30; t = 2.82; p< .01).
(3) After controlling for the effects of specific mastery variables (mastery
striving) on the outcome variable, the relationship between the predictors and the
outcome was reduced. Specifically, although perfectionism remained the best
predictor at step 3 ( showing no significant reduction in beta value from step 2 to step
3), the predictive power ofType A and rational coping style at step 2 were
significantly reduced at step 3 (reducing the beta weight from .23 to .07 for Type A,
and reducing the beta weight for rational coping style from -.20 to -.07). This analysis
suggests that perceived seriousness and perceived control mediate the link between
specific mastery strivings (Type A and rational coping style) and diabetes distress.
When perceived seriousness and perceived control were manipulated independently in
the mediation analysis to determine their relative impact on the predictor variables,
perceived control, when introduced at step 3, effected the greater reduction in beta
values for both Type A and rational coping from step 2 (from .23 to .06 for Type A;
from -.20 to -.05 for rational coping). For perceived seriousness, when introduced at
step 3, the magnitude of reductions in beta values was of a lesser order (from .23 to
.15 for Type A; from -.20 to -. 17 for rational coping). Thus, of the illness beliefs,
perceived control appears to operate as a key mediator of the effects of specific
mastery strivings (Type A and rational coping) on diabetes distress. However, illness
beliefs do not mediate the effects of perfectionism on diabetes distress.
3.4.3. Self-Care Behaviour: Mastery Strivings v Illness Beliefs
A second series of hierarchical regression analyses examined the power of relevant
psychosocial variables (mastery strivings and illness beliefs) to predict an individual's
self-care behaviour (general diet, exercise, and blood sugar monitoring). After
entering the relevant demographic variables, mastery strivings were entered at the
second stage, followed by illness beliefs (see Tables 6.1; 6.2; and 6.3).
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3.4.3.1. General Diet
Of the psychosocial variable groups identified in Table 6.1, mastery strivings
contributed most strongly to variance in general diet (mastery strivings r2 change =
17** • illness beliefs r2 change = .05). In evaluating the contribution of individual
demographic variables to variance in the outcome measure, the number of years in
formal education was the best predictor of general diet in the final model (beta = -.25;
t = -2.48; p <.05 level). Of the psychosocial variables, rational coping (mastery
striving) and perceived control (illness belief) were the strongest predictors of diet in
the final model (rational coping: beta = .28; t = 2.72; p <.01; perceived control', beta.
= .24; t = 1.91; p < .06). Although illness beliefs as a group did not make any
significant additional contribution to variance in the outcome measure, a mediation
analysis suggests that perceived control partially mediates the effects of rational
coping on general diet (beta value of rational coping reducing from .39 at stage two to
.28 at the final stage).
Criteria for Mediation: (i) in separate regression analyses, rational coping (beta= .38;
t = 4.18; p<.01) and perceived control (beta= .33; t = 3.44; p< .01) predict diet,
(ii) rational coping predicts perceived control (beta= .39; t = 4.06; p< .01). (iii) beta
value of rational coping, reduced from .39 at step two to .28 at the final step
(Table 6.1).
3.4.3.2. Exercise
In examining the power ofmastery strivings and illness beliefs to predict an
individual's tendency to undertake exercise, the relevant demographic variables (age,
type of diabetes) were entered at step 1, followed by mastery striving variables at step
2, and illness beliefs at step 3 (Table 6.2). Neither the demographic variables nor
either group of psychosocial variables made a substantial additional contribution to
variance in exercise (mastery strivings r2 change = .08: p > .05 ; illness beliefs r2
change = .03: p > .05). Regarding the contribution of specific independent variables
to the equation, while rational coping was the best psychosocial predictor of exercise
level at step 2 (beta =.26; t = 2.53; p< .05), in the final model, such predictive power
was reduced (beta =.21; t = 2.53; p > .05).
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Table 6.1 Mastery Schemas v Illness Beliefs: Hierarchical Regression
Analysis to predict Self Care Behaviour (square of diet)
Step Predictors Beta t Adj. R2 total R2change
Diet
1 Demographics .09* .12*
Diab.Duration .16 1.57
Employ.status -.08 -.75
Years in educ. -.22* -1.99
Mastery Strivings
Diab. Duration .13 1.34
Employ.status -.10 -.95
Years in educ. -.24* -2.32
Perfectionism -.16 -1.58





Years in educ. -.25* -2.48
Perfectionism -.13 -1.34
Type A .11 .94
Rational .28** 2.72
Perc. serious. .04 .29
Pere.effect. .12 1.12
Perc. control .24 1.91
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Table 6.2 Mastery Schemas v Illness Beliefs: Hierarchical Regression




Type Diabetes .13 1.09
Mastery Strivings
Age .06 .46
Type of diabetes .15 1.26
Perfectionism -1.22 -1.11




Type Diabetes .14 1.15
Perfectionism -.11 -1.00
Type A .01 .11
Rational .21 1.81
Perc. serious. .10 .73
Perc.effect. .12 .97











In examining the power of the relevant psychosocial variables to predict blood sugar
monitoring, the relevant demographic variables were entered at step 1, followed by
mastery strivings at stage 2, and illness beliefs at the final stage (Table 6.3).
With regard to the groups of independent variables, demographics made the strongest
additional contribution to variance in blood monitoring behaviour (r2 change= .19** )
followed by illness beliefs ( r2 change = .07*).Regarding the contribution of specific
independent variables to the equation, gender (beta = .27; t = 2.84; p <.01 ) and
insulin dependence ( beta = -.29; t = -2.22; p < .05 ) were the best demographic
predictors of blood monitoring behaviour in the final model. Of the psychosocial
variables, perceived effectiveness of treatment was the strongest predictor of blood
monitoring in the final model ( beta =.26; t=2.28; p= <.05). The predictive power of
Type A at step 2 (beta=.22; t =2.16; p<.05) was attenuated at step 3. A mediation
analysis suggested that perceived treatment effectiveness may mediate the effects of
type A on blood monitoring behaviour, although this mediation effect is weak.
That is, in accordance with the criteria of Barron & Kenny (1986): (i) Type A
predicted blood monitoring at stage 2; perceived treatment effectiveness predicted
blood monitoring at stage 3 (see Table 6.3). (ii) In a separate regression analysis,
Type A was found to be a predictor of perceived treatment effectiveness (beta = .28:
t= 2.82; p<.01). (iii) In Table 6.3 below, Type A, while significant at step two (p<.05),
became nonsignificant at step 3 but the beta value only reduced form .22 to 0.15.
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Table 6.3 Mastery schemas v Illness Beliefs: Hierarchical Regression
Analysis to predict self care behaviour ( blood monitoring)









Diabetes type -.03 -.23
Ins.dep -.32* -2.70
Perfectionism -.10 -.96




Diabetes type -.03 -.27
Ins.dep. -.29* -2.22
Perfectionism -.07 -.70
Type A .15 1.34
Rational .08 .78
Perc. serious. .04 .30
Perc.effect. .26* 2.28








3.4.4.1. Glycaemic Control - Baseline
To determine the power of psychophysiological variables (inhibition, rumination, and
Type A) to predict baseline HbAlc scores, a hierarchical regression analysis was
undertaken, with the relevant demographic variables (marital status, insulin
dependence) entered first, followed by self-care variables (diet, exercise, blood sugar
monitoring) at step 2, and then psychophysiological variables (rumination, inhibition,
and Type A) at the final stage (see Table 7.1). Demographic variables, as a group,
contributed most strongly to outcome variance (demographics: r2 change = .12**).
Neither self care behaviours, as a group, nor psychophysiological variables, as a
group, made any additional contribution to variance in the outcome measure ( self
care variables: r2 change = .02 ; psychophysiological variables: r2 change = .04).
Moreover, as to the contribution of each individual variable to baseline HbAlc
variance, marital status (demographics) was the best predictor at step 3 (beta=.24;
1=2.29; p<05).
3.4.4.2. Glycaemic Control - 6 month follow-up
To determine the potential for psychosocial variables to predict Hbalc scores at
follow up, demographic variables were entered first, followed by self care variables,
then the psychophysiological variables at the final stage(see Table 7.2). As with
baseline HbA1 c Scores, neither self care behaviour, as a group, nor
psychophysiological variables, as a group, made any significant additional
contribution to variance in the outcome measure (self care variables:r2 change = .01;
psychophysiological variables: r2 change = .04). Demographic variables as a group,
on the other hand, did contribute to outcome variance (demographics: r2 change =
.36**). As to the relative contribution of each independent variable to the equation,
three demographic variables - insulin dependence (beta = -.47; t = -.4.44; p< .01),
diabetes duration (beta = -.49; t = -.4.75; p< .01) and comorbidity (beta = .26; t =
.2.79; p< .01) were found to be the best predictors of follow-up HbAlc scores at
every step of the analysis. Moreover, one of the psychophysiological variables -
emotional inhibition was the strongest psychosocial predictor of follow-up HbAlc
scores in the final model (beta=-.21; t=-2.18; p<.05).
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Table 7.1 Self Care Behaviours V Psychophysiological Variables:
Hierarchical Regression Analysis to predict HbAlc scores
at baseline
Step Predictors Beta t Adjusted R2 R2 change
1 Demographics .10** .12**
Marital Status .26** 2.63
Insul.dep. -.21* -2.07
SelfCare




Blood mon. .06 .53
3 Psychophysiological Processes .09* .04




Blood mon. .12 1.00




Table 7.2 Self Care Behaviours V Psychophysiological Variables:
Hierarchical Regression Analysis to predict HbAlc scores
at follow up
Step Predictors Beta t Adjusted R2 R2 change
1 Demographics .34** .36**
Insulin Dep. _ 49** -5.22
Diab.Duration _ 44** -4.60
Comorbidity .30** 3.33
SelfCare
Insulin Dep. _ 46** -4.35
Diab.Duration . 44** -4.42
Comorbidity 29** 3.22
Gen. Diet .03 .32
Exercise -.11 -1.14
Blood Mon. .05 .49
3 Psychophysiological Processes .35** .04
Insulin Dep. _ 47** -4.44
Diab.Duration _ 49** -4.75
Comorbidity .26** 2.79
Gen. Diet .03 .30
Exercise .13 -1.29
Blood Mon. .10 .95







This study was concerned with determining the key relevant psychosocial predictors
of diabetes related distress, self-care behaviour, and glycaemic control.
4.1. Predictors of Diabetes Distress (Emotion Regulation v Illness Beliefs)
Cognitive models of psychopathology enjoy an exalted status in the psychological
literature with much empirical support attesting to their validity. Indeed, over the last
decade or so, such "mentalising" approaches have come to displace more
experiential/humanistic approaches to human psychological difficulties. There is an
implicit assumption in this cognitive world view that cognition antedates emotion, and
that cognitive therapeutic strategies and techniques are prepotent in reshaping
perspective which in turn begets a commensurate emotional response. However,
psychodynamic or person centered therapies, in their concern with key relationship
processes in the formative years, attach primacy to psychological defences or coping
styles to regulate difficult or painful emotional states. The need to defensively
disavow or in some way neutralize threatening affect has paved the way for a therapy
process geared toward reclaiming lost experience and thus effecting more internal
psychological coherence. When contemplating the differentiating features of these
models, an important distinction is that between conscious appraisal processes on the
one hand and unconsciously enacted emotional regulation processes on the other.
Thus, beyond conscious cognitive appraisals, the question arises as to the role of such
emotion regulation processes in determining psychological adjustment. As earlier
stated, research has shown that tendencies toward negative rumination in relation to a
stressor may help to maintain dysfunctional emotional reverberations over a
considerable period and, concurrently, exacerbate cognitive biases. In addition, the
research literature on the inhibition or nondisclosure of feeling states vying for
expression has affirmed how internal conflict with associated somatic symptoms is
often an inevitable derivative. In the present study, the relative contribution of
specific cognitive appraisals and emotional regulating processes to diabetes related
distress was thus investigated to help illuminate issues of primacy, or indeed, the
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character of any interrelationship that may exist. In other words, which of these
processes is a significant determinant of variance in distress levels and might some
variables serve to mediate the effect of the others?
In the present study, emotional rumination was found to be a predictor of diabetes
distress. This association with rumination accords with Roger's finding (1993) that
stress reactivity may be maintained by ruminative thinking - a form of impaired
problem solving (i.e. emotional rumination is a form of sustained dysfunctional
information processing). In other words, circular perseverative thinking about a
distressing incident or experience serves to maintain the duration of the
psychophysiological stress response significantly beyond the cessation of the stressor
in question. The negative or dysfunctional information processing involved can be
likened to "a runaway train" which gathers more speed and momentum over time and,
in the process, becomes increasingly difficult to moderate or control. People often
report how, with incessant ruminative thinking, distressing thoughts become more
intense, amplified, and emotionally dysphoric, and that "switching off' the disturbing
material becomes progressively more difficult. The phenomenon of the "rushing,
racing mind" is well documented as is its detrimental effects on sleep. As verified by
Roger (1998), delayed physiological recovery from a stressful event can be mediated
by emotional rumination. As a psychological process, it thus appears to be pivotal in
maintaining an agitated state with resultant negative impacts on mood, cognitive
appraisals, and bodily processes.
Beyond emotional rumination, specific illness appraisals or beliefs, namely, perceived
control of diabetes and the perceived seriousness of the condition, also predicted
diabetes distress levels. Moreover, a mediation analysis indicates that illness beliefs
(control and seriousness) partially mediated the effect of emotional rumination on
diabetes distress. This suggests that specific illness appraisals are possibly secondary
epiphenomena, with certain emotional control processes, namely, rumination, being
the "prime mover " of distress levels. However, in the view of Brosschot & Thayer
(2004, p. 106.), "perseverative thinking might be viewed as the cognitive
manifestation and nourisher of the deeper underlying experience of perceived
uncontrollability" which causes a " continuing reactivation of specific illness related
cognitive networks" leading towards " overabundant illness perception". Perceived
74
seriousness may be a derivative of this. At the very least, the present finding attests to
an interdependence of illness appraisals and emotion regulating processes. Partial
mediation allows for the possibility of a degree ofmutual influence between the two
variables. With the relative primacy afforded to rumination in the present analysis
notwithstanding the possibility of an interdependent relationship, an optimal
therapeutic strategy may necessitate different domains of dysfunction being targeted
in sequence. Although traditional cognitive models posit cognitive interventions as
being centrally effective in reshaping emotional responses, the present analysis would
tend to point, in the first instance, to psychological approaches which address
ruminative tendencies directly as a precursor to more cognitively oriented
interventions. As an example, mindfulness stress reduction training enjoys solid
empirical support for its effectiveness in reducing the propensity for negative
rumination (Jon Kabut Zimm, 1990; Sugiura,Y.2004). It provides a methodology to
facilitate disengagement from 'mentalising' and to connect more fully with current
ongoing sensory or 'lived' experience. Segal, Williams, & Teasdale (2002) provide a
solid theoretical rationale, corroborative research, and associated protocols for its
effective implementation in combination with cognitive therapeutic strategies to
reduce vulnerability to ruminative tendencies and related negative emotional states.
Their implied sequencing effect, as described, is consistent with the 'relative primacy
effect' found in the present research. Emotional perturbation may need to be reduced
to containable levels to allow therapeutic access to more verbal-rational processes
(reflectiveness and heightened emotionality are often mutually exclusive processes).
Indeed, when one is emotionally contained, the sense of personal control is enhanced
(perseverative negative thinking, on the other hand, evokes a sense of diminished self
coherence and, with that, a loss of emotional control).
Given the suggested mediating aspect of illness representations, a finding which
supports hypothesis (i), efforts geared towards reshaping beliefs about the relative
uncontrollability of the condition and/or correcting distorted notions about it's
perceived seriousness, may also have a role in reducing heightened distress levels. An
interesting issue, however, is whether cognitive interventions in and of themselves are
sufficient for "breaking" the hold of negative thoughts/ appraisals within the context
of heightened emotion and physiology mediated by the ruminative response tendency.
The general implication would seem to be that a broad biopsychosocial framework
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should be sensitively applied when considering how best to intervene clinically with
patients.
4.2. Predictors of Diabetes Distress (Illness Beliefs v Mastery Strivings)
Much of the current research literature focuses on the centrality of personal illness
models in the mediation of self-care behaviours. The concept of illness
representations or personal models sits comfortably within an overarching cognitive
theory of emotional distress which, in short, postulates that cognitions are the primary
determinants of emotional reaction and behavioural response. Indeed, the emphasis of
many health behaviour models and current health research is on the proximal
"experientially near" conscious cognitions with other more distal belief systems
deemed to be less influential as determinants of illness related emotions and/or
behaviours.
In the present study, specific illness beliefs were compared with 'low lying' mastery
strivings for their capacity to predict levels of diabetes distress. Compulsive mastery
strivings (perfectionism, Type A behaviour) can be conceptualised as broad based
dispositional traits rooted in varying degrees of emotional need deprivation in the
early years. At another level, they can be described as compensatory strategies forever
in the service of 'shoring up' precarious self-esteem. That is, appraisals or evaluations
about the self are based on one's perceived ability to attain some exacting standard of
performance in an area of human endeavour; in essence, a conflicted and dissatisfied
self forever trying to remain psychologically buoyant through accomplishment
pursuits. Drawing on cognitive theorizing, one can infer underlying cognitive
schemata concerning the need to achieve, succeed etc to feel acceptable to others, and,
by implication, to oneself. Compensatory strivings of this type reflect fundamental
vulnerabilities within the personality. Illness representations, on the other hand, might
more properly be regarded as experientially near 'cognitive echoes' of these deeply
held but largely 'silent' fundamental self appraisals. A self in conflict (with related
compensatory strivings) would be expected to be less emotionally contained and
therefore, more prone to distorted cognitive appraisals regarding one's life situation.
Conflicted emotionality, when it intrudes, distorts and skews awareness and thus
militates against reality based appraisals. The relative absence of core emotional
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conflicts within the personality structure should be manifest as a more 'imperturbable
self, capable of weathering the vicissitudes of human stresses, ofmaintaining a
'steady course in troubled waters'. From a cognitive perspective, the relative absence
of "evaluative schemas " underpinning the self concept in a more integrated
personality structure would be consistent with greater emotional stability in the face
of "failure experiences" or episodes of nonattainment of goals (in this instance,
diabetes related self-care behaviour or glycaemic control), as this would not threaten
the self structure.
In the present study, of all the mastery strivings variables, only perfectionism was
found to be a predictor of diabetes distress in the final model. In contemplating this
finding, namely, that a loading on perfectionism increases vulnerability to diabetes
related distress, the dichotomous 'cognitive lens' inherent in perfectionism is
potentially explanatory. With a tendency to dichotomise experiences as all good/all
bad, one would be highly vulnerable to emotional derailment in situations where
exacting self standards were perceptibly not fulfilled. Confronted with the inevitable
"lapses" associated with blood sugar control (despite the investing of sterling efforts
to maintain glycaemic control), a fossilized self concept with exacting standards of
performance could easily be prone to emotional destabilization. Type A behaviour
patterns, on the other hand, which are also defensive and compensatory manoeuvres
fuelled by precarious and uncertain self-esteem, do not have, as a constituent
cognitive component, the rigid "all or nothing character" of perfectionism. Thus,
while Type A mastery strivings are similarly based on a compulsive need to prove
oneself, the strivings are more generalist in nature and predicated on personal
advancement and social comparison issues (competitiveness). As such, diabetes
related strivings may have less personal salience for such individuals in that they may
not be considered relevant or central to a generalised need for personal/social
advancement. Perfectionism, on the other hand, when deeply ingrained, may
encompass a wide range of behavioural strivings, and be characterized by a basic
intolerance of 'less than perfect performance' - the so called 'tyranny of
perfectionism'.
However, Type A behaviour (positive association), perfectionism (positive
association) and rational coping (negative association) were predictors of diabetes
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related distress at step 2, a finding which supports hypotheses (ii) and (iii). That is to
say, compulsive mastery strivings are positively associated with diabetes distress
whereas healthy strivings are negatively associated with diabetes related distress. In
large measure, this accords with the basic tenets of self determination theory which
suggests that compulsive strivings are potentially toxic to one's emotional health in
circumstances where personal goals cannot be realized. Interestingly, the two types of
compulsive mastery strivings (perfectionism and Type A) were the strongest
predictors of diabetes distress, with the more healthy mastery striving (rational
coping) remaining predictive but to a lesser degree (at step 2). However, when illness
beliefs were entered at step 3, only perfectionism remained predictive with Type A
and rational coping becoming less significant. At step 3, while perfectionism
remained the strongest predictor, perceived control (negative association) and
perceived seriousness (positive association) were also predictive. One implication is
that perfectionism may have distinct psychological properties compared with Type A
and rational coping in that the impact of these latter mastery strivings on diabetes
distress was partially mediated by perceived control and perceived seriousness (no
mediation effect was found in relation to perfectionism). In other words, their effects
were dissolved in the final model while perfectionism endured as a predictor variable.
Hypothesis (iv) thus receives only partial support given that mediation operates in
relation to some but not all the mastery strivings variables assessed. In trying to
understand this, the concepts ofType A behaviour and rational coping style merit
further scrutiny.
Type A behaviour patterns indicate a form of agitated striving against a backdrop of
inadequacy/insecurity feelings experienced as intolerable. Thus feelings of inferior
self-worth lurk constantly in the background, resulting in a negative affective tinge
imbuing all experiences. The threat to the self-structure arising from a medical
condition which has, as a possibility, deteriorating health over time may well be
particularly salient in Type A personalities whose driving philosophy is to maintain a
competitive edge and sense ofmastery at all times. The impact ofType A strivings
may thus be mediated, in conscious awareness, by perceived loss of control of aspects
of their condition.
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Similarly, when contemplating a rational coping style, one can infer underlying
feelings of self-efficacy in the face of life's struggles/challenges. A belief in the
capacity for mastery/transcendence of adversity at a core fundamental level could,
understandably, translate, at the level of conscious awareness, into perceptions of
control of one's diabetes. Thus, while the influence of Type A and rational coping
style was "dissolved" at step 2, the results suggest that their influence may
"transmute" into more specific illness representations at a conscious level. Moreover,
the fact that perfectionism remains predictive from step 2 to step 3, in the absence of
any reduction in the relationship between perfectionism and the outcome variable at
stage 3, suggests that perfectionism is characterised by distinctive psychological
properties which differentiate it from Type A and rational coping. The unconscious
aim of perfectionism may be the removal of any basis for criticism by others and, in
the process, to keep alive the fantasy of acceptance/affirmation by others. In many
ways, the audience that is being played to is 'an internal one' (an introjected
relationship). Similarly, in Type A, the threat to the self structure is at the intrapsychic
level - the anticipation of being left behind in a competitive world invites the prospect
of censure from a punitive introjected relationship. However, the frantic affective
tinge is more salient in Type A, rendering the individual more driven, restless and
competitively hostile (the emotional baseline is comparatively more conflicted and
turbulent, in other words). Within this context, the idea ofmuting this
'ambitious/driven' side to the personality can seem very threatening to such
individuals as it may be perceived as affording others a competitive advantage. Thus,
the need for control across key domains in one's life may be strongly felt and
therefore relinquished with great difficulty. The results obtained thus suggest that
certain illness representations may, in fact, be nothing more than the conscious
manifestation of underlying broad based character strivings. They also suggest that
the intense need for control/mastery, and associated feelings of threat in Type A may
be of tyrannical proportions. In rational coping, which is a more flexible orientation,
mastery/control concerns are also resonant but to a lesser degree. In perfectionism
however, it is less the drive toward mastery that is problematic: rather, it is the
evaluative lens used to judge performance. In short, whereas as Type As' strive
relentlessly for mastery/achievement, perfectionists, while not 'driven' in such a
generalist fashion, bring very judgemental standards to bear on their performances.
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4.3. Interactive Cognitive Subsystems (ICS): A Theoretical Interlude
According to Interactive Cognitive Subsystems theory (Teasdale, 1993) the
immediate antecedents to negative affective states are higher level meanings encoded
in dysfunctional implicational schematic models. Dysfunctional models, when in the
ascendancy, frequently evoke a sense of helplessness, threat, and hopelessness.
Accordingly, any therapeutic strategy should strive to reinstate the operation ofmore
adaptive schematic models of experience (a sense of 'mastery/taking control'). In
addition to specific meanings having a capacity to alter such implicational codes,
Teasdale(1993) cites body state elements together with acoustic and visual elements
as potentially contributory to the alteration of schematic models. In consideration of
meaning elements, holistic implicit meanings, rather than specific propositional
meanings, should, theoretically, be the central focus of therapy. While not negating
the contribution of thought/image modification as helping to activate a "parent"
adaptive schematic model, the general therapeutic strategy should be to create
alternative schematic models rather than to devise a "search and destroy" mission in
relation to negative thoughts (Teasdale, 1993). Indeed, beyond strictly cognitive
interventions, many of the nonspecific factors of therapy, he maintains, help to
regenerate"mastery/problem focussed" schematic models in place of
"helplessness/hopelessness models". Feeling that one is affirmed, listened to, and
taken seriously, can create space to reflect anew and consider alternative perspectives
and strategies. This often rekindles hope and a new sense of possibility.
When contemplating therapeutic direction, one must bear in mind that states of high
psychological distress with associated intense emotional rumination, autonomic
arousal and loss of both self-coherence and capacity for self-directed rational
thinking, may negate the impact of cognitive work to address dysfunctional
appraisals. As earlier reported, clinical impression would often suggest, for example,
that heightened emotionality needs to be reduced to an optimal level before a person
becomes amenable to more verbal reflective therapies. A therapeutic response may
thus need to be crafted which is most efficacious in addressing the implicational "felt
sense" of loss of control. As previously asserted, feeling states (including an
awareness of disturbed physiology) are conceptually laden. They carry implicit
meaning content. Heightened autonomic activity may, at the level of implicit
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meanings, contribute to a generation of negative schematic models. In this context,
emotion containment strategies may, for example, restore a sense of coherence and
personal control. Indeed, a wide range of interventions - emotional containment
strategies, experiential methods, physical exercise, stress management procedures etc
are legitimate therapeutic components if they effect change at the level of higher level
meanings (implicational code).
This accords with Williams (1997) thesis concerning the mutually reinforcing
hierarchical layers ofmeaning that inform cognitive appraisals in health. To address
illness appraisals independently of broader contextualizing core belief systems runs
the risk, at the very least, of therapeutic ineffectiveness, and, at worst, of an
exacerbation of any dysfunctional schematic models. For example, targeting illness
beliefs to enhance perceived control independently of underlying dormant
perfectionistic needs, may unwittingly contribute to increased feelings of
helplessness/ hopelessness if rigid 'all or nothing' standards are not simultaneously
modified. In short, multiple layers ofmeaning/beliefs need to be considered when
formulating a general therapeutic strategy concerned with the generation of adaptive
schematic models (implicational code).The present results, in identifying both the
reality and relevance of certain interdependent belief systems at different levels of
awareness and generality, lend support to this thesis.
4.4. Predictors of Self Care Behaviour (Mastery Strivings v Illness Beliefs)
4.4.1. Diet
Of the demographic variables, years in education predicted adherence to diet, with
those who were better educated showing less adherence. This variable may partly
reflect an achievement striving which influences values, attitudes, choices, and
priorities. Investing more time in education could result, over the longer term, in
career choices with a greater potential for personal advancement. However, such
advancement may demand ambition, drive, and singularity of purpose. Remaining
mindful of the need for healthy eating patterns may be more difficult under such
conditions.
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As to the psychological variables impinging on self-care behaviour, rational problem
solving, a healthy mastery striving, was the only psychosocial predictor of general
diet after controlling for demographics (years in education). Hypothesis (v) thus
receives support in relation to diet. That is, healthy mastery is associated with good
self care in the domain of dietary habits. There was no support found for hypothesis
(vi) which suggested that compulsive mastery strivings would predict poor self care in
this area. With the introduction of illness beliefs at step 3, perceived control
approached significance, with a dilution of the impact of rational coping in the final
model. This suggests a mediation pathway ,that is, perceived control of diabetes may
partially mediate the effect of rational coping on general diet. This provides partial
support for hypothesis (vii) which suggests a mediation pathway between mastery
strivings and self care behaviour, although the finding is specific to a particular
mastery striving.
As earlier suggested, rational problem solving may be closely related to robust self-
efficacy feelings - one index of personal maturity. According to Schwarzer & Fuchs
(1996), self-efficacy can be considered a generalized trait reflecting a personal
resource or maturity factor, and refer to studies which have successfully used
generalized measures of self efficacy to predict behaviour. Motivational drives rooted
in a relatively integrated, emotionally contained personality may thus be a necessary
prerequisite for the task ofmaintaining a healthy diet over the longer term. With this
motivational attitude, a diabetes sufferer may approach dietary habits in a flexible
way, perceiving the need to shape general eating habits as circumstances demand. In
this case, there would a relative absence of psychological threat to the self concept in
situations where 'lapses' might occur; hence, the ability to regain the initiative would
be correspondingly easier. This contrasts with behaviour informed by compulsive
attitudes borne of personality based conflicts. In the latter, rigid schemas
incorporating perfectionistic standards /compulsive mastery needs might be
potentiated within the context of faltering dieting efforts, culminating in a derailment
of any attempts to regroup and persevere. Rational problem solving, on the other
hand, reflects a cognitive processing style which is less distorted by unmet
developmental emotional needs. Moreover, with the healthier degrees of personality
integration implied in this coping style, there may be less pressure to engage in
'comfort eating' - a phenomenon driven by negative emotional states. Indeed,
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'comfort eating'can be regarded as a frequent cause of self care 'lapses' in diabetic
patients' eating patterns. An inherent capacity for maintaining emotional stability in
the face of life's pressures may reduce the emotional need for food at times of stress.
As the results suggest a mediation effect, perceived control of diabetes may therefore
be a context specific conscious expression of a more fundamental sense within the
personality of self control, personal agency, hope and future possibility.
One implication of this result is that therapeutic efforts targeting dietary habits can
address a multiplicity of levels which have the potential to activate functional
schematic models of 'taking control','hope for the future' ' staying steady' etc. The
routes to these functional parent schemas may be more or less direct in some cases.
However, concern with the implicit felt sense is of paramount importance at all times.
Within this context, the understandable impulse to target the more immediate dietary
'givens' may not, however, be the most therapeutically efficacious approach.
Dysfunction in one specific domain of behaviour may represent a more pervasive
disturbance in the personality structure. A psychological formulation which delineates
the core schemas, beliefs, unmet needs and associated defenses should assist the
tailoring of a strategy which is optimally effective.
4.4.2. Exercise
Adherence to recommended exercise patterns, as a self-care task, was not predicted by
any of the psychosocial variables in the final model. However, rational problem
solving did predict this outcome variable at step 2, a finding which, again, offers
support for hypothesis (v) in a self care domain (exercise). No support was found for
hypothesis (vi) That is, none of the compulsive mastery strivings were associated with
self care in this area. Although termed a diabetes self care task, this domain may, in
fact, be the most difficult to sustain, comparatively speaking. Research has
consistently shown that the various aspects of the diabetes regimen (exercise, diet,
blood monitoring, mediation taking) are weakly correlated, with the life style
components (diet, and, in particular, exercise) showing the poorest levels of
compliance (Toobert, 2000). One reason may be that habits, once laid down, are
difficult to change. Much evidence attests to the importance of instilling exercise
habits in the early years if it is to become an enduring feature of adult life. There may
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be a whole host of conditioning processes and environmental constraints which bind
eating and exercise habits to aspects of day to day living, rendering them less
amenable to change by conscious effort/decision-making. For example, a poorly
conditioned body may experience negative side effects upon initial attempts at
increasing exercise patterns. At a theoretical level, negative operant conditioning may
result in a cessation or reduction in such routines to reduce anticipated physiological
discomfort. Thus, the perceived costs of this health behaviour (anticipated
pain/exhaustion) may override any perceived health benefits (Health Belief Model
and Protection Motivation Theory). Similarly, a hectic, busy daily routine may
constrain possibilities for undertaking exercise on a regular basis. Time constraints
may act as a disincentive to exercise in those who prioritise material/financial goals
over health issues. More simple constraints might be the lack of suitable walk ways,
for example, in a persons locality. In short, a multiplicity of variables may impinge on
this domain which override the effects ofmastery strivings and/or illness beliefs. As
such, the narrow range of psychosocial predictors deployed here may be insufficient
to account for habits ofbehaviour which may be significantly influenced by
environmental and conditioning processes. However, the fact that rational coping was
predictive at step 2 suggests that a healthy mastery striving is an important
psychological attribute when faced with a task which, by all accounts, is physically
taxing, difficult to sustain, and competes with other priorities in a demanding world.
Indeed, one measure ofmaturity is the extent to which one can deny immediate
gratification needs to pursue longer term goals in the absence of any obvious
dividends in the interim eg. study habits. Rational coping may, as earlier stated,
reflect a degree of emotional maturity which helps a person to undertake and sustain
exercise habits for longer term, not so obvious, health benefits. Psychological
interventions concerned with promoting this maturity variable (which is here
associated with healthy exercise habits) should ensure that content issues do not
eclipse concerns with the process of intervention. In other words, an autonomy
supportive therapeutic context may best promote behaviour change by encouraging
nondefensive engagement and personal authorship of any actions undertaken in this
field. However, beyond process issues, and given the multiplicity of influences on this
variable, adopted therapeutic strategies should reflect the complexities involved.
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4.4.3. Blood Monitoring
In regard to demographic variables, insulin dependence was a predictor of blood
monitoring behaviour in the final model. The need to calibrate insulin dosage
correctly is very important for those on insulin as short term complications can readily
ensue if errors are made. Blood monitoring, as the mechanism for establishing blood
sugar levels, is essential to this task of calibration and should thus be reasonably well
represented in this group. Gender was also a significant predictor, with women more
likely to undertake blood monitoring as required. This may reflect a greater sense of
responsibility in women for their own health and wellbeing and a greater level of self
sufficiency in medical self care. Observation often suggests that men, by comparison,
can be somewhat dependent on their partners for managing their medication,
prompting them to visit their doctor etc.
In consideration of potential psychosocial predictors, when illness beliefs, as a group,
were introduced at the final stage, their additional contribution to the variance in
blood monitoring behaviour was limited. Within this grouping, perceived
effectiveness of treatment was predictive of blood monitoring. Moreover, there was
some support for hypothesis (vii) with the suggestion of an illness belief (treatment
effectiveness) mediation pathway between mastery strivings (Type A) and blood
monitoring. Checking blood sugar levels may be one particular self-care domain
which is distinguished by the relative complexity of learning involved ie coming to
understand and act appropriately (retitrate insulin, dietary or exercise requirements)
on the feedback from blood sugar monitoring to correct poor glycaemic control. The
fact that perceived effectiveness of treatment was the sole psychological predictor in
the final model may well suggest that primacy be given to this particular illness belief
in treatment efforts. In other words, unless and until a patient can come to clearly
perceive a cause - effect relationship between blood monitoring and glycaemic
control from their own personal experience, blood monitoring may be considered
redundant and of little value. The paraphernalia involved may actually assist them in
sustaining their efforts in the service of treatment goals. As a barometer of level of
understanding in this domain, beliefs about perceived effectiveness of treatment may
thus be usefully explored in the first instance. The discovery of negative treatment
beliefs may require that a refresher educational component be provided to refine the
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persons understanding of the value of this feedback loop for individualized, and thus
more efficient, self care efforts. On a more practical level, a possible need dictated
by low beliefs about treatment effectiveness may be the requirement to revise
frequency of insulin use, its timing, the change of eating patterns to accommodate
exercise routines etc. In short, a change in the treatment regimen may need to be
contemplated in accordance with current treatment efficacy considerations, life style
changes etc.
Of the mastery striving variables, Type A was found to be positively associated with
blood monitoring at the 2nd step of the regression analysis. This undermines
hypothesis (vi) which suggests that compulsive mastery should be negatively related
to self care behaviour. Moreover, no support was provided for hypothesis (v) in this
self care domain. In consideration of the present finding that perceived treatment
effectiveness possibly mediates the relationship between Type A behaviour and
blood monitoring, the nature of these psychological variables merits further
discussion.
Type A behaviour straddles two conflicting realities. At an unconscious level, there is
self doubt and insecurity; at the level of conscious awareness, however, there is
inflated self efficacy feelings regarding the possibilities for controlling and
overcoming environmental challenges. Defensive beliefs of this nature are the
mechanism which impel and maintain compulsive behaviour. Perceived effectiveness
of treatment may, at one level, be sensed by the individual as a reflection of their own
capacity for mastering challenges as '99% of diabetes care is self care' (Rubin, 2000,
p.237). Treatment behaviours are self behaviours and thus potentially act to mirror
judgements about the self. Feeling the need to control environmental threats which
may jeopardise possibilities for personal advancement, Type A's may thus develop
and maintain positive illusions ofmastery concerning discrete behavioural diabetes
tasks potentially within their immediate control. This finding accords with the
theorizing of Taylor (1983) who describes a process of underlying mastery/control
needs distorting illness beliefs to maintain a positive self image and keep alive hope
for the future. Blood monitoring behaviour, as a discrete task within their control, may
have more personal significance for Type A's in contrast to diet and exercise
behaviours which can be affected by many extraneous factors beyond their immediate
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control. They may not be as schema-relevant, in other words. In support of this, the
current study found little support for Type A as a predictor of either diet or exercise.
4.5. Self Determination Theory: Relevance for Diabetes Adaptation
To understand the relevance of the present collective findings for psychological
adaptation in diabetes (emotional wellbeing and self care behaviour), it is helpful to
revisit self-determination theory as propounded by Ryan & Deci (2000). As
described earlier, the authors posit a needs-based theory of human motivation.
Specifically, their theory, which is solidly grounded in research, emphasizes the
importance of core psychological needs for relatedness, autonomy, and competence
throughout the lifespan. Problems with self-esteem only emerge when such core needs
have been distorted or frustrated in some way. From a self determination perspective,
there is a paradox about self-esteem: "if you need it, you don't have it, and if you
have it, you don't need it"(Ryan & Brown, 2003, p.74). In commenting on the
essential character of self-esteem, the authors describe qualitative variations, labelled,
respectively, contingent and noncontingent self-esteem.
According to this theory, self-esteem issues arise from psychological need
deprivation. In contingent self esteem, feeling good about oneself is conditional upon
a sense of 'measuring up' in the eyes of others. A developmental precursor might
include, for example, exposure to a form of parenting which involved the withholding
of affirmation/valuing of the child if certain standards of behaviour were not met.
With such conditional acceptance, the seeds of insecurity are sewn. Consequently,
compensatory drives arise in the service ofmaintaining relatedness to others but at an
emotional cost. The theory proposes that these distinctive childhood relationships
('conditional regard') gradually give way in adulthood to a form of behavioural self-
regulation whereby actions become motivated by a constant need for approval from
an 'internal audience'. With this motivational orientation, the person has become
distant from his own feeling states and, ultimately, from his/her core identity. Indeed,
the identity sense is often absent or poorly formed in such cases. Arising from the
wholesale internalisation of parental/societal values, it can be characterized, as a
heightened sensitivity to social expectations, culminating in conformist behaviour, the
pursuit of inauthentic goals originating from a 'false self structure (Winnicott, 1965).
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With regard to perfectionism and Type A behaviour patterns (introjected defensive
interpersonal strategies to resolve conflicts associated with conditional self
acceptance), the fact that both are predictive of diabetes distress is understandable.
One can infer underlying unstable self evaluations, as the sense of identity is based on
precarious foundations - contingent acceptance by others. Type A behaviour reflects a
particular variant ofmastery striving fuelled by contingent self-esteem. The defensive
aspects of this self structure are manifested by an intense, agitated 'drive' for control
in many aspects of the person's social world. At a certain dulled level of awareness,
however, the threat of loss of control/mastery frequently resonates in the background.
In the present study, perceived control of diabetes is negatively associated with Type
A strivings. Moreover, regression analysis suggests that perceived loss of control of
diabetes may mediate the association between Type A and diabetes distress. With no
such evidence of a mediator role for perceived control in the relationship between
perfectionism and distress, the question arises as to the relative intensity of the need
for control in these two mastery striving variables. Perfectionism, although similarly
incorporating a compulsive need for acceptance through action, is not characterized
by the same intensity of emotional agitation as occurs in Type A behaviour patterns.
The need for control may thus be differentially weighted, intrapsychically, in these
respective personality traits.
Such core schemas, if centrally relevant to problems of adaptation in diabetes, should
be targeted therapeutically. Enlisting the patient to address issues of his own
psychology at different levels of awareness, beyond strictly diabetes concerns may be
clinically helpful. For example, becoming aware of unconscious needs/vulnerabilities
(dysfunctional assumptions) driving extremist behaviour can lead to a reevaluation
and revision of habitual strivings, goals, and priorities. In addition, stress management
frameworks can be introduced to increase understanding of how underlying
vulnerabilities can lead to stressful life style choices/patterns which, in turn, may
trigger psychological and physiological disequilibrium. Moreover, beyond therapeutic
approaches which attempt to forge new insights at a conscious level, a good
therapeutic relationship itselfmay be centrally influential in effecting positive internal
change not necessarily mediated by conscious awareness. For example, if a therapist
is so zealous in their efforts to liberate a person from their present "impasse"
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(noncompliance, for example) that they strenuously direct their efforts toward
rekindling motivation in self-care behaviour, the therapeutic relationship may suffer.
By not being sufficiently attuned to needs for emotional connection in, for example, a
person alienated from others/family/friends, primary needs for relatedness may be
overlooked in favour of an approach which directly addresses the more obvious
diabetes concerns. The subtext of conditional acceptance by the therapist in this
situation may be unconsciously registered by the individual. This may serve to
heighten the sense of threat to the self concept, fuel defensive strivings, and ultimately
maintain an amotivational state. On the other hand, a therapeutic relationship which
disconfirms learned expectancies from the past through the provision of a more
accepting, person centred orientation (attuning to other life stresses, for example) may
afford a much needed unconditional emotional connection (relatedness) with
resultant improvements in noncontingent self esteem. Moreover, increased motivation
to change may be an unprompted gradual offshoot of a core sense of connectedness to
an affirming, concerned person at a time of personal insecurity. Rigid compensatory
strivings (i.e. perfectionism, Type A patterns) within the personality structure may be
gradually loosened under such conditions. With motivational drives rendered less
compulsive, a person may be better equipped, psychologically speaking, to maintain a
steady course in respect of the lifelong vissicitudes of diabetes self care.
Staying within the self-determination perspective, the discovery of emotional
rumination as a predictor of diabetes distress similarly suggests an anxious conflicted
personality in thrall to an inflexible achievement need .That is to say, rumination, as
earlier described, typically arises when continuing discrepancies arise between present
reality and intensely held needs/goals/ aspirations. This constant chasm between
aspirations and reality is the inevitable by-product of internalized 'conditions of
worth'. Moreover, it provides the dynamic for self dissatisfaction, inner restlessness,
and goal preoccupation. In the present study, while perfectionism and Type A were
positively associated with diabetes distress (step 2), rational coping was negatively
associated with distress. This supports the notion of underlying emotional security
preoccupations being a core feature of compulsive mastery strivings - a compulsive
need to engage in goal oriented pursuits, with any nonsecuring of goals evoking
feelings of loss of control/failure with associated injuries to the self concept.
Unfortunately, the nonproductive aspects of ruminative thinking stultifies the capacity
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for constructive action and reinforces feelings of hopelessness/helplessness. While
healthy mastery strivings should, theoretically, increase mastery experiences and
enhance self esteem, compulsive mastery strivings, paradoxically, invite more
'failure' experiences and related feelings of distress. The presence of such
dysfunctional schemas are thus fertile breeding grounds for ruminative tendencies
under stress.
In short, psychological considerations beyond more immediate diabetes concerns
frequently need to be addressed. In all of this, there is an implication that positive
change at the level of these core structures (general values/goals/beliefs/coping
mechanisms) will facilitate emotional adjustment to diabetes itself. Moreover, when
addressing diabetes issues explicitly, the present findings would suggest that an
autonomy supportive process may have the greatest potential for reining back the
excesses of compulsive mastery strivings. Such an approach contains an implicit
message that any decision to change must originate within the individual, and that any
help is offered nonjudgementally and without demand characteristics. Such an
approach invites nondefensive engagement as it reduces the resonance of a distant
judgemental past which helped shape compulsive strivings.
4.6. Glycaemic Control (Self Care Behaviour v Emotion Regulation Processes)
As physiological correlates have been demonstrated for emotional coping processes
and Type A behaviour, the present study sought to determine the relative contribution
of these physiologically reactive psychosocial factors to variance in blood sugar
levels, after controlling for relevant demographic variables and self-care behaviours.
A comparison of haemoglobin scores at baseline (most recent score) and follow up
(after a six month interval) was undertaken to permit cross sectional and longitudinal
comparisons.
Regarding baseline blood sugar levels, neither self care behaviours, as a group, nor
psychosocial variables, as a group, made a significant contribution to variance in the
outcome variable after controlling for relevant demographic variables (marital status
was a significant predictor in the final model). Moreover, no specific variable in either
group was predictive of blood sugar levels. At six months follow up, however, a
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number of demographic variables were predictive of blood sugar levels. Those who
were insulin dependent and had comorbid medical complications had higher HbAlc
scores; on the other hand, the longer one had diabetes, the better was one's metabolic
control (lower HbA 1 c scores). As many type 2 patients proceed to insulin in later life
due to problems in controlling blood sugars, the relationship with insulin dependence
is understandable. In addition, comorbid conditions, in reflecting a possible
progression of diabetes related pathologies, would imply a less well managed
condition; blood sugar control could be, understandably, higher in this context. By the
same token, length of time with the condition, in the absence ofprogressive secondary
complications, could aid adaptation to the condition both psychologically and at the
level of selfmanagement. Learning to adapt to diabetes may require much trial and
error learning and considerable time to allow the establishment and consolidation of
healthy routines and self care habits. Beyond demographic predictor variables,
behavioural self care variables again made no additional contribution to variance in
glycaemic control at 6 month follow up. However, one of the psychosocial variables -
emotional inhibition - was predictive ofblood glucose levels.This particular result
thus provides partial support for hypothesis (viii). That is to say, a specific
psychophysiological variable contributed to variance in blood sugar levels after
controlling for self care behaviour.
4.7. Cross sectional and Longitudinal Comparisons
In the cross sectional design, independent variable scores were obtained after
measures of the outcome variable (most recent HbAlc score) had been taken. In this
context, ratings of independent variables could be reactive to outcome scores, even
though they are used as predictor variables. The prospective design, relative to the
cross sectional design, is a statistically more robust method for detennining predictive
relationships as the outcome variable measures (follow up HbAlc scores six months
later) are obtained at a significant time interval after independent measures have been
obtained. In the latter, any predictive relationships found between independent and
outcome variables are not confounded by the problem of reactivity. Comparisons
between the two designs is infonnative for that reason. However, there are possible
statistical confounds in the present study which may limit any conclusions that may
be reached. One such confound is the difference in sample size from HbAlc baseline
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to HbAlc follow-up. A number of patients who provided HbAlc scores at baseline
did not attend their diabetes review clinics at follow up, resulting in a reduced sample
size (N reduced from 96 to 89). While HbAlc scores at baseline and follow up were
highly correlated (r = .82), the different sample sizes may have differentially affected
the separate regression analysis results.
In addition, the correlations between demographic variables and HbAlc scores varied
from baseline to follow-up which, in turn, ensured that the group of demographic
variables entered at step one in the separate regression analyses were not
the same. For baseline HbAlc scores, marital status and insulin dependence were
entered at step one. For follow up HbAlc scores, however, duration of diabetes,
comorbid medical complications, and insulin dependence were entered at the first
step. As regression analysis is highly sensitive to any independent variables entered,
the different results obtained may be attributable to this statistical artefact.
Bearing in mind these considerations, the finding of a predictive relationship between
emotional inhibition and glycaemic control at follow-up after controlling for relevant
demographic variables and self-care behaviours is noteworthy given that that the
variance in glycaemic control for the population as a whole was relatively narrow
(mean score of 8.46 at 6 months follow up: standard deviation 1.21).One implication
is that a specific psychophysiological variable, in this instance inhibition, may
mediate changes in glycaemic control. As earlier stated, Pennebaker (1989) drew
attention to the noxious effects of emotional inhibition which involves chronic
physiological 'work', and causes an accumulation of low level physiological stress. A
corollary of his theory is that emotional disclosure obviates the need for autonomic
work associated with the suppression of 'built up' emotion. Theoretically, this should
reduce physiological stress within the individual and, as a corollary, negate the effect
of stress on metabolic control.
This present finding supports the association between emotional inhibition and
physiological reactivity, and, in addition, suggests that a specific physiological index
- blood sugar - is directly influenced by this psychosocial variable. It undermines a
previous finding by Bodor (2004) which, although affirming the link between
emotional disclosure and improved health, found no specific association with
92
metabolic control. This apparent contradiction might be explained by the fact that
differences in loading on this trait (emotional inhibition) may affect level of
vulnerability to inner physiological strain under stressful conditions. The level of any
health benefits of emotional disclosure may thus depend on how central this coping
style is to the individuals psychological functioning. Bodor (2004) did not control for
this in their research. The present result highlights the potential relevance of
emotional inhibition, as a trait variable, in helping to account for individual
differences in the relationship between stress and metabolic control.
In the cross sectional design, the absence of any relationship between emotional
inhibition and HbA 1 c scores may be partially understood by the predictive
relationship found between metabolic control and marital status in the final model (the
prospective design did not include marital status among the demographic variables).
Not being married was predictive of lower blood sugars in the cross sectional design;
a tendency to inhibit emotional expression was also predictive of lower blood sugars
in the prospective design. Arguably, opportunities for emotional disclosure would be
reduced when one is not living with a partner. The contribution ofmarital status to
variance in the outcome variable may therefore be attributable to reduced
opportunities for disclosure (the influence ofmarriage on self care behaviours cannot
account for marital impact on glycaemic control as these behaviours were controlled
at step two in the regression analysis). The marital status variable, in possibly sharing
some overlap with the inhibition variable, may have attenuated the latter's influence
on glycaemic control in the cross sectional comparison. In the present sample,
although small, the negative correlation (r = - . 14) between marital status and
emotional inhibition suggests this possibility of variance overlap in the two
constructs.
A clinical implication of this finding is that, over and above the traditional emphasis
given to medically relevant variables, namely, medication needs and self-care
behaviour (diet, exercise, blood monitoring), any established tendency to internalize
distressing feelings may need to be therapeutically targetted in its'own right. It points
up the importance of providing an opportunity for patients to talk, in a focussed way,
about the emotionally distressing aspects of either living with diabetes or, indeed,
other concurrent stressors in their life. Should opportunities for emotional disclosure
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be sidelined, from a treatment point of view, due to an exclusive concern with more
medically oriented variables, health outcomes may suffer. The weak correlation
frequently found between self-care behaviours and glycaemic control bears testimony
to the potential importance of other factors in glycaemic control; opportunities for
emotional disclosure may be one such factor.
The present result is consistent with the finding that physiological stress reactivity can
have a direct influence on glycaemic control (Bradley's 1994) and that stress
reactivity, while more frequently associated with elevated blood sugar, is occasionally
associated with reduced blood sugar levels. In the present study, the beta value
indicates a negative association (consistent with Bradleys 'minority' finding),
suggesting that increased inhibition is associated with lower blood sugar levels. Thus,
individual differences need to be acknowledged. At any rate, in keeping with the
disclosure paradigm, the process of emotional disclosure may, depending on the
context, attenuate stress levels and aid the restabilization of glycaemic control.
The potential clinical need for emotional disclosure aspects to the therapeutic process
contrasts with a prevailing orthodoxy in many psychological communities which
afford primacy to cognitive methods/ approaches for addressing disturbances of
emotion, both in mainstream mental health and in relation to coping with diabetes.
The heavy emphasis on such models in the clinical literature has the potential for
overshadowing or peripheralising a solid and growing empirically supported
knowledge base governing mind/body relationships which attest to the importance of
emotional processing in health. The present finding may aid a healthy realignment in
the relative importance of distinct therapeutic approaches.
4.8. Limitations of the Research
Certain limitations of the present study need to be borne in mind. Although regression
analysis is primarily concerned with identifying predictive relationships between a set
of independent variables and specific outcome variables, causal relationships cannot
be ascertained from this correlational design. The influence of other unmeasured
variables may underlie the relationships found between variables. According to
Tabachnick & Fydell (1996, p. 131) "demonstration of causality is a logical and
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experimental, rather than statistical, problem". Cause effect relationships can only be
demonstrated when systematic changes in outcome variables follow systematic
manipulation of independent variables after other relevant variables have been
controlled. Accordingly, while the tone of the discussion above implies causality in
the relationships found, the case is certainly not airtight, from a statistical point of
view. Rather, any tentative conclusions drawn are suggestive only, and are based as
much on reasoned consideration of the research literature and theoretical position
statements as on the results of the present study.
A specific problem in trying to determine predictors ofblood sugar control in this
study was the small amount of variance attaching to this outcome variable (mean
baseline HbAlc score 8.56: SD of 1.39; mean HbAlc follow-up score 8.46 ; SD of
1.21). This may have statistically constrained the possibilities for uncovering
authentic predictor variables as, in general, establishing relationships with other
variables is facilitated by optimal amounts of variance in the variables concerned.
Within this limiting context, the discovery of emotional inhibition as a predictor of
blood sugar control is all the more noteworthy. Similarly, measurement of another set
of outcome variables (diet, exercise, and blood monitoring) was also constrained by
the limited range of item values on the scales measuring this variable (0-7). With
such a narrow range of item values, variance in the outcome measure will be
artificially constrained; this, in turn, significantly limits the potential for genuine
predictor variables to statistically reveal themselves. More fine grained outcome
measures, with a greater range of item values, might have increased the opportunities
for the statistical detection of relationships. In support of this hypothesis, the relevant
predictor variables entered in the regression analysis in respect of diabetes distress
(the other outcome measure) contributed to significantly more variance in the
outcome measure. The greater range of values employed in the diabetes distress
questionnaire very probably facilitated this (range of values: 0-100; mean 30.43; S.D.
24.17). Finally, although a number of predictor variables were identified in the
present analysis, the amount of variance predicted was small in many instances.
Although tentative conclusions are drawn from the results, the net overall contribution
of psychosocial variables to diabetes outcomes variance points up the multiplicity of
factors potentially impacting on diabetes outcomes.
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Regarding the Type A construct, the Framingham Type A scale used in this study
possibly failed to capture all the essential ingredients of this toxic behavioural pattern.
Most models ofType A behaviour pattern, for example, have typically highlighted
three key aspects - time urgency, competitiveness, and hostility (Keyper & Martyn,
1989). The Framingham Type A scale, although including items reflecting
competitiveness and time urgency, has few items indicative of hostility and
aggressiveness (Kawachie et al., 1998). As earlier stated, while a measure such as the
Framingham scale is appropriate when looking at the global construct (mastery
strivings), it may not be particularly sensitive in the context of investigations of stress
reactivity (hostility being the key 'reactivity' component as identified by research).
With respect to the findings concerning Type A behaviour , the issue of the
percentage of the sample who were formally employed may limit conclusions
concerning generalizability of the results. In the present study, 60% of the sample
were unemployed. Type A behaviour may well be situation specific in that it implies
the existence of a pressurising environment which forever carries the potential for
failure or loss of control. As a personality characteristic, it may thus require certain
external conditions to render it an observable pathology. In the present example, the
absence of formal employment may have attenuated the effects of this compulsive
mastery striving on the individual. It is hard to imagine someone being in constant
'flight fight' mode when living at home, either unemployed, or formally retired.
Flome is generally a relaxed and noncombative environment. Any type A strain in the
personality structure may, as a result, have been artificially muted by the nature of the
sample. In the present study, there was a moderate positive correlation between Type
A and employment ( r = .33*).'Very possibly, in a more conducive environment
(ie competitive, pressurising), the impact of type A behaviour may have been more
transparent, at the level of emotion, self care behaviour, and metabolic control.
While the current study purports to assess both compulsive and healthy mastery
strivings, it is acknowledged that the measures used assessed different facets of these
strivings depending on the particular mastery striving involved. For example, while
perfectionism (cited as a compulsive mastery striving) was assessed at the level of
predominantly self-referential cognitive beliefs, Type A mastery strivings were
measured at the level of behaviour (the outward behaviour allowing inference about
96
underlying mastery strivings). Further, a healthy (noncompulsive) mastery striving, in
this study, was deduced from a capacity for rational problem solving (again, an
inferred construct based on a particular style of responding to stressful situations).
The different modalities ofmeasurement across these compulsive and healthy mastery
domains leave open the question of the validity of the inferred construct underlying
them. Future studies could employ more consistent measurement modalities across
these different domains.
A related issue is the extent of construct overlap in the three types ofmastery
strivings. Theoretically, perfectionism and type A strivings are thought to originate
from personal insecurities borne of contingent regard in the formative years and, in
their manifestation, reflect a compulsive need to prove oneself worthy
intrapsychically and/or in the eyes of others. Springing from a similar root and
possessing similar surface characteristics raises the issue of whether there is
sufficient conceptual difference in the two constructs to enable psychological
measurement tools to discriminate between them for research purposes. For example,
Flett et al (1994) found various components ofType A behaviour were positively
associated with the three dimensions of the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale for
a male sample. In the case of females, positive associations were found with two of
the subscales of the MPS. In the present study, ratings on the two scales enjoyed a
moderate positive relationship (r = .4; p< .01), a finding which, although affirming the
natural association between the two constructs, also suggests construct differentiation
by the absence of a perfect correlation. Face validity indicates that the item content of
the respective scales is different in emphasis, suggesting that the constructs, as
measured here, are, indeed, qualitatively different. However, to guard against
confounding of these variables, future studies concerned with these related
psychological realities might look to psychometric measures with good discriminative
power.
Similarly, rational coping, here considered to be a derivative of high self efficacy,
might often be associated with perfectionism and Type A behaviour in circumstances
conducive to favourable performance. High expectations/standards coupled with
commensurate compulsive strivings might be reflected in strong beliefs in one's
ability to cope with demanding situations under ones control. Hart et al (1998), for
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example, found higher levels of self efficacy in those who measured highly on the
socially prescribed perfectionism scale of the MPS (low self efficacy was associated
with the other two subscales of the MPS, however). In the present study, rational
coping was very weakly correlated with both perfectionism (r = - .01) and Type A
behaviour (r =.09), suggesting that rational coping is a qualitatively different construct
and possibly reflects a more adaptive flexible response tendency associated with
positive emotional adjustment (unlike perfectionism and Type A behaviour which
correlated positively with diabetes distress).
Another issue not addressed in the present study is the issue of content of goal
strivings. According to the self concordance model (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999), those
pursuing goals which are consistent with the persons developing interests and core
values invest more effort in accomplishing those goals and are more likely to achieve
them. In the absence of any assessment ofpersonal goals ( eg. a self listing of things a
person strives to do in daily life), it is not possible to make solid judgements about the
extent to which diabetes self care behaviours are included in such interests and
priorities. While one can talk about compulsive mastery strivings in general, such
strivings may only apply to specific behaviour domains. For example, if diabetes self
management behaviours are not included within the range of a person's perfectionistic
behaviours, diabetes self care may be approached quite flexibly. On the other hand,
someone whose perfectionism encompasses 'all and sundry' behaviours may address
diabetes self care in a rigid 'all or nothing' way. Similarly, Type A behaviour which
involves the compulsive pursuit of work-related goals may result in the neglect of
diabetes self care behaviours due to their perceived lack of relevance within the
person's set of centralized aims and values. Another individual, however, with the
same personality attributes, may locate diabetes self care efforts centrally in their
mastery strivings if treatment neglect is deemed to threaten core aspirations. Future
studies should include an assessment of personal goal strivings in keeping with the
tenets of the self concordance model.
4,9 Conclusions
Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, the present findings suggest that
certain underlying personality based traits and processes do have an influence on
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diabetes outcomes and, as such, need to be considered when psychological issues are
being addressed.
In the domain of psychological adjustment, the present findings suggest that an
appraisal of particular illness beliefs for their relevance to emotional state variables
should occur within the context of a broad evaluation of dispositional mastery
strivings within the individual. In particular, an evaluation of the degree of
compulsivity ofmastery strivings may be especially pertinent to diabetes related
distress levels. Meanings, appraisals and attitudes at different levels of awareness and
generality are interdependent, with each level influencing, and, in turn, being
influenced by the other. Therapeutic interventions should thus be tailored to address
multiple levels of cognitive representation having relevance for emotional adjustment
in diabetes. A person-centred autonomy supportive relationship which encourages a
nondefensive exploration of the influence of underlying compulsive psychological
needs and strivings, and associated values on conscious attitudes toward living with
diabetes, may, by heightening self awareness, enable the emergence ofmore flexible
attitudes with associated improvements in emotional adjustment.
Further, the present findings suggest that a specific emotion regulation process -
ruminative worrying - contributes to the shaping and consolidation of negative
thoughts and feelings about diabetes. Efforts to contain such perseverative thinking
should result in more functional information processing and improved affect. A
ruminative tendency may thus need to be therapeutically targeted as an adjunct to
interventions addressing diabetes related emotional concerns through a more
discursive modality. As one example, mindfulness training, with its researched
effectiveness in reducing mental agitation, could be usefully co-opted as part of the
therapeutic endeavour to maximize the effectiveness ofmore established
psychological approaches ( eg cognitive restructuring of negative illness beliefs
/problem solving etc ).
In the domain of diabetes self care behaviours, rational coping, a healthy mastery
striving, was predictive, to varying degrees, of the life style self care behaviours (diet
and exercise). Compulsive mastery strivings (perfectionism and type A behaviour), on
the other hand, bore no obvious relationship to these behavioural domains. This
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suggests that the lifestyle requirements of the diabetes regimen may not typically
activate dysfunctional mastery schemas. Difficulties in judging ongoing adherence to
prescribed but rather amorphous behaviours such as diet and exercise may, in the
mind of the patient, obscure their relationship with glycaemic control. On the other
hand, the potential for tighter control and adherence may be more readily experienced
in relation to more easily calibrated discrete self care behaviours such as blood sugar
checking which, in the present study, was influenced by Type A strivings and
perceptions of treatment effectiveness. Thus, specific self care domains, being
differentially affected by compulsive mastery strivings, may require a different
emphasis in therapeutic approach. While lifestyle behaviours (diet and exercise) may
be facilitated by a flexible rational problem solving style promoted within an
autonomy supportive relationship, the therapeutic approach with more discrete self
care behaviours such as blood sugar monitoring, should, in addition, remain sensitive
to, and cater for, the potential influence of underlying compulsive mastery/control
strivings.
As to psychosocial influences on glycaemic control, a specific emotion regulation
process - emotional inhibition - did contribute to variance in this outcome measure.
This accords with the relationship found between marital status and metabolic control.
A possible explanatory factor underlying these concordant results is the cumulative
destabilizing effects of physiological stress arising from the habitual nondisclosure of
feelings states. In more healthy circumstances, emotions might be expressed and
shared more fluidly, resulting in a reestablishment of physiological homeostasis.
While the link between stress reactivity and metabolic control has been established by
research, the potential importance of emotional inhibition as a physiological stressor
which impacts on glycaemic levels has not been sufficiently explored. A clinical
implication of the current finding is the need for a safe trusting therapeutic alliance
which provides opportunities for the disclosure and exploration of any accompanying
emotional concerns the diabetes sufferer may bring to the consultation. In addition to
the positive general impact this may have on emotional state and self care behaviours
(and thus, indirectly, on blood sugar levels), there may also be a positive specific
effect on glycaemic control mediated directly by the increased physiological
homeostasis arising from more routine disclosure of feelings.
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Taken together, the present findings point up the relevance of enduring personality
based traits and processes for understanding how people cope with diabetes. A
general implication of the above is that treatment approaches should reflect a concern
with the interplay between distal dispositional variables on the one hand, and
proximal psychological factors more directly associated with illness dimensions on
the other. Recent research trends in diabetes have tended to give primacy to the latter
with scant attention paid to these broader underlying personality-based influences.
The findings of the present study may help to redress that balance.
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Predictor variables: Emotion regulation v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Square root of distress (data transformed)
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Figure 2.1 Histogram
Predictor variables: Emotion regulation v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Distress (before data transformation)




Predictor variables: Emotion regulation v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Distress (before data transformation)
Dependent Variable: diabetes-related emotional distress
Regression Standardized Predicted Value
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Figure 3.1 Histogram
Predictor variables: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Square root of distress (data transformed)
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Dependent variable: Square root of distress (data transformed)
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Figure 4.1 Histogram
Predictor variables: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Distress (before data transformation)
Dependent Variable: diabetes-related distress







Predictor variables: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Distress (before data transformation)
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Figure 5.1 Histogram
Predictor variables: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Square of diet (data transformed)
Dependent Variable: Square of diet
Mean = -0.02






Predictor variables: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Square of diet (data transformed)
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Figure 6.1 Histogram
Predictor variables: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Diet (before data transformation)




Predictor variables: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Diet (before data transformation)
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Figure 7.1 Histogram
Predictor variables: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Exercise




Predictor variables: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Exercise
Dependent Variable: self care behaviour - exercise
2 3
Regression Standardized Predicted Value
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Figure 8.1 Histogram
Predictor variables: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Blood sugar monitoring




Predictor variables: Mastery strivings v Illness beliefs
Dependent variable: Blood sugar monitoring
Scatterplot
Dependent Variable: self care behaviour - blood sugar monitoring
Regression Standardized Predicted Value
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Figure 9.1 Histogram
Predictor variables: Self care v psychophysiological factors
Dependent variable: Most recent HbA1c score




Predictor variables: Self care v psychophysiological factors
Dependent variable: Most recent HbA1c score
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Figure 10.1 Histogram
Predictor variables: Self care v psychophysiological factors
Dependent variable: Future HbA1c score




Predictor variables: Self care v psychophysiological factors
Dependent variable: Future HbA1c score
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Personal Models of Diabetes Scale
Please circle the answer that best describes how you feel:
1. How serious is your diabetes?
Not at all serious Slightly serious Fairly serious Very serious Extremely serious
2. How important is following your self care recommendations ( for example, diet, exercise,
and glucose testing) for controlling your diabetes?
Not all important Slightly important Fairly important Very important Extremely
Important
3. How worried are you about developing complications of diabetes (like eye problems,
foot ulcers, heart attacks)?
Not at all worried Slightly worried Fairly worried Very worried Extremely worried
4. How important is controlling your blood glucose level for avoiding complications from
diabetes?
Not at all important Slightly important Fairly important Very important Extremely
Important
5. How frustrated do you feel when trying to take care of your diabetes?
Not at allfrustrated Slightlyfrustrated Fairlyfrustrated Very frustrated Extremely
Frustrated
6. How much has having diabetes changed your activities ( such as your family and social
events, work or hobbies)?
Not at all Slightly Moderately A lot Completely
7. How much control do you feel you have over your blood glucose levels?
No control Slight control Moderate control A lot ofcontrol Complete
control
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For the next question, say what you believe is importantfor controllingyour diabetes, which may be
different from what is true for other people, or what you think the healthcare team may think. Take
your own circumstances into account. Circle the number that best describes your feelings.
How IMPORTANT is each of the following for controlling your diabetes?
Probably Not Slightly Fairly Moderately Very
Important Important Important Important Important
a. Exercising regularly? 1 2 3 4 5
b. Not smoking? 1 2 3 4 5
c. Testing your blood glucose
regularly? 1 2 3 4 5
d. Recording your blood glucose
results regularly/ 1 2 3 4 5
e. Checking your feet regularly? 1 2 3 4 5
f. Following a low fat, high fibre eating plan? 1 2 3 4 5
g. Not eating many sweets? 1 2 3 4 5
h. Drinking little or no alcohol? 1 2 3 4 5
i. Managing sick days as recommended? 1 2 3 4 5
j. Making sure you get regular medical tests
for diabetes-related problems (eg. Eye
exams, cholesterol, blood pressure)? 1 2 3 4 5
139
For the next question, say what you believe is likely to be helpfulforpreventing complications ofyour
diabetes, which may be different from what is true for other people, or what you think the healthcare
team may think. Take your own circumstances into account. Circle the number that best describes your
feelings.
How LIKEL Y is each of the following to help preventfuture complications ofyour diabetes (such as




a. Exercising regularly? 1
b. Not smoking? 1
c. Testing your blood glucose
regularly? 1
d. Recording your blood glucose
results regularly? 1
e. Checking your feet regularly? 1
f. Following a low fat, high fibre eating plan? 1
g. Not eating many sweets? 1
h. Drinking little or no alcohol? 1
i. Managing sick days as recommended? 1
j. Making sure you get regular medical tests
for diabetes-related problems (eg. Eye
exams, cholesterol, blood pressure)? 1
Slightly Moderately Fairly Very
Likely to Likely to Likely to Likely to
Help Me Help Me Help Me Help Me
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
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Multi-Dimensional Perfectionism Scale
Please circle the number that best corresponds to your agreement with each statement below. Use this
rating system: Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree
1. My parents set very high standards for me.
2. Organization is very important to me
Strongly Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
3. As a child, I was punished for doing
things less than perfect
4. If 1 do not set the highest standards for
myself, I am likely to end up a second
rate person
5. My parents never tried to understand
my mistakes
6. It is important to me that I am thoroughly
competent in everything do
7. I am a neat person
8. I try to be an organised person
9. If I fail at work, I am a failure as a person.
10. I should be upset if I make a mistake
11. My parents wanted me to do the best
at everything
12. I set higher goals than most people.
13. If someone does a task at work better than
I, then I feel like I failed the whole task
14. If I fail partly, it is as bad as being a
complete failure
15. Only outstanding performance is good
enough in my family
16. I am very good at focusing my efforts
on attaining a goal
17. Even when I do something very carefully,






























18. I hate being less than the best at things....
19. I have extremely high goals
20. My parents have expected excellence
from me
21. People will probably think less ofme
if I make a mistake
22. I never felt like I could meet my parents
expectations
23. If I do not do as well as other people, it
means I am an inferior human being
24. Other people seem to expect lower
standards than I do
25. If 1 do not do well all the time, people
will not respect me
26. My parents have always had higher
expectations for my future than I have....
27. I try to be a neat person
28. I usually have doubts about the simple
everyday things that I do
29. Neatness is very important to me
30. I expect higher performance in my
everyday tasks than most people
31. I am an organized person
32. I tend to get behind in my work because
I repeat things over and over
33. It takes me a long time to do something
right
34. The fewer mistakes I make, the more
people will like me
35. I never felt like I could meet my parent's
standards
Framingham Type A Behaviour Pattern Measure
1 Very Fairly Some Not at
Traits and qualities which describe you: Well well what all
1. being hard driving and competitive - -
2. usually pressed for time - — —
3. being busy or dominating —
4. having a strong need to excel
in most things — —
5. eating too quickly —
II
At the end of an average day at work, do you feel:
6. often very pressed for time? Yes No
7. that work stayed with you so you were
thinking about it after hours? Yes No
8. that work often stretched you to the
very limits of your energy and capacity? Yes No
9. often uncertain, uncomfortable, or
dissatisfied with how well you were doing? Yes No
III
10. Do you get upset when you have to wait for
anything? Yes No
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Emotional Control Questionnaire (ECQ4)
Name: Sex: Age:
Instructions : Indicate how you feel about each item by circling either "TRUE" or "FALSE".
If an item is neither entirely true nor false, choose the alternative most like you. If you
haven't been in the situation, please say how you feel you would behave in that situation.
1. I remember things that upset me or make me angry for a long time afterwards.
2. I don't bear a grudge - when something is over, it's over, and I don't think about it again.
3. When someone upsets me, I try to hide my feelings.
4. Some people need somebody to confide in but I prefer to solve my own problems.
5. I get worked up just thinking about things that have upset me in the past.
6. I often find myself thinking over and over about things that make me angry.
7. Even when I feel upset about something I don't feel the need to talk to anyone about it.
8. People find it difficult to tell whether I'm excited about something or not.
9. I like to talk problems over to get them off my chest.
10. I feel vulnerable if I have to ask other people for help.
11. In the past I have found a problem easier to solve if I have talked it over with someone.
12. It is good to hear problems out loud.
13. If I receive bad news in front of others I usually try to hide how I feel.
14. It helps to discuss a problem even if it is impossible to reach a solution.
15. I seldom get preoccupied with worries about my future.
16. I have friends who I know would help me but I find it difficult to ask.
17. I seldom show how I feel about things.
18. If I see something that frightens or upsets me, it stays in my mind for a long time afterwards.
19. I think people show their feelings too easily.
20. My failures give me a persistent feeling of remorse.
21. When something upsets me I prefer to talk to someone about it than to bottle it up.
22. For me, the future seems to be full of troubles and problems.
23. There are some situations in which I am unable to confide in anybody.
24. I often feel as if I'm just waiting for something bad to happen.
25. When I am reminded of my past failures, I feel as if they are happening all over again.




























27. Sometimes 1 have to force myself to concentrate on something else to keep distressing
thoughts about the future out of my mind.
TRUE FALSE
28. Intrusive thoughts about problems I'm going to have to deal with make it difficult for me to
keep my mind on a task.
TRUE FALSE
29. 1 don't feel embarrassed about expressing my feelings. TRUE FALSE
30. 1 don't let a lot of unimportant things irritate me. TRUE FALSE
31. I wish I could banish from my mind the memories of past failures. TRUE FALSE
32. I am unable to trust anybody with my problems. TRUE FALSE
33. I am afraid that if I confide in someone they will tell my problems to others. TRUE FALSE
34. I never get so involved thinking about upsetting things that I am unable to feel positive about
the future.
TRUE FALSE
35. I am not afraid to ask somebody for help. TRUE FALSE
36. I worry less about what might happen than most people I know. TRUE FALSE
37. It takes me a comparatively short time to get over unpleasant events. TRUE FALSE
38. Sometimes I am unable to confide even in someone who is close to me. TRUE FALSE
39. Any reminder about upsetting things brings all the emotion flooding back. TRUE FALSE
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Coping Style Questionniare (CSQ-3)
Name: Age: Sex:
Instructions: Although people may react in different ways to different situations, we all
tend to have a characteristic way of dealing with things which upset us. How would you
describe the way you typically react to stress? Circle Always (A), Often (O),
Sometimes (S), or Never (N) for each item below:
1. Feel overpowered and at the mercy of the situation. A O S N
2. Work out a plan for dealing with what has happened. A 0 S N
3. See the situation for what it actually is and nothing more. A O S N
4. Become miserable or depressed. A O S N
5. Feel that no-one understands. A 0 S N
6. Do not see the problem or situation as a threat. A 0 S N
7. Feel that you are lonely or isolated. A O S N
8. Take action to change things. A O s N
9. Feel helpless - there's nothing you can do about it. A 0 s N
10. Try to find out more information to help make a decision
about things.
A 0 s N
11. Keep things to myself and not let others know how bad
things are.
A 0 s N
12. Feel independent of the circumstances. A 0 s N
13. Sit tight and hope it all goes away. A 0 s N
14. Take my frustrations out on the people closest to me. A O s N
15. Resolve the issue by not becoming identified with it. A 0 s N
16. Respond neutrally to the problem. A O s N
17. Pretend there's nothing the matter, even if people ask. A 0 s N
18. Get things into proportion - nothing is really that important. A 0 s N
19. Believe that time will somehow sort things out. A O s N
20. Feel completely clear-headed about the whole thing. A O s N
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21. Try to keep a sense of humour - laugh at myself or the
situation.
A 0 S N
22. Keep thinking it over in the hope that it will go away. A 0 S N
23. Believe that I can cope with most things with the minimum
of fuss.
A O S N
24. Daydream about things getting better in future. A 0 S N
25. Try to find a logical way of explaining the problem. A O S N
26. Decide it's useless to get upset and just get on with things. A 0 S N
27. Feel worthless and unimportant. A O s N
28. Trust in fate - that things will somehow work out for the
best.
A 0 s N
29. Use my past experience to try to deal with the situation. A O s N
30. Try to forget the whole thing has happened. A 0 s N
31. Become irritable or angry. A 0 s N
32. Just give the situation my full attention. A 0 s N
33. Just take one step at a time. A O s N
34. Criticise or blame myself. A 0 s N
35. Pray that things will just change. A O s N
36. Think or talk about the problem as if it did not belong to
me.
A O s N
37. Talk about it as little as possible. A O s N
38. Prepare myself for the worst possible outcome. A O s N
39. Look for sympathy from people. A O s N
40. See the thing as a challenge that must be met. A O s N
41. Be realistic in my approach to the situation. A O s N
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SUMMARY OF DIABETES SELFCARE-ACTIVITIES (2)
The questions below ask you about your diabetes self-care activities during the past 7 days. If you were
sick during the past 7 days, please think back to the last 7 days that you were not sick. Please answer
the questions as honestly and accurately as you can. Your responses will be confidential.
DIET
1. How many of the last SEVEN DAYS have you followed a healthful eating plan?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. On average, over the past month, how many DAYS PERWEEK have you
followed your eating plan?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. On how many of the last SEVEN DAYS did you eat five or more servings of fruits and
vegetables?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. On how many of the last SEVEN DAYS did you eat high fat foods such as red meat or full-fat
dairy products?
0 12 3 4 5 6 7
EXERCISE
5. On how many of the last SEVEN DAYS, did you participate in at least 30 minutes of physical
activity? (Total minutes of continuous activity, including walking).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. On how many of the last SEVEN DAYS did you participate in a specific exercise session
(such as swimming, walking, biking) other than what you do around the house or as part of
your work?
0 12 3 4 5 6 7
BLOOD SUGAR TESTING
7. On how many of the last SEVEN DAYS did you test your blood sugar?
0 12 3 4 5 6 7
8. On how many of the last SEVEN DAYS did you test your blood sugar the number of times
recommended by your health care provider'?
0 12 3 4 5 6 7
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FOOT CARE
9. On how many of the last SEVEN DAYS did you check your feet?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. On how many of the last SEVEN DAYS did you inspect the inside of your shoes?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SMOKING
11. Have you smoked a cigarette - even one puff- during the past SEVEN DAYS?
0. No
1. Yes. If yes, how many cigarettes did you smoke on an average day?
2. Number of cigarettes:
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Problem Areas in Diabetes (PAID) Questionnaire
INSTRUCTIONS: Which of the following diabetes issues are currently a problem for you?
Circle the number that gives the best answer for you.
Please provide an answer for each question. Somewhat
Not a Minor Moderate serious Serious
problem problem problem problem problem
1. Not having clear and concrete goals for
your diabetes care? 0 1 2 3 4
2. Feeling discouraged with your diabetes
treatment plan? 0 12 3 4
3. Feeling scared when you think of
living with diabetes? 0 12 3 4
4. Uncomfortable social situations related
to your diabetes care? 0 12 3 4
5. Feelings ofdeprivation regarding
food and meals? 0 12 3 4
6. Feeling depressed when you think
about living with diabetes? 0 12 3 4
7. Not knowing if your mood or feelings
are related to your diabetes? 0 12 3 4
8. Feeling overwhelmed by your diabetes? 0 12 3 4
9. Worrying about low blood sugar reactions?.0 12 3 4
10. Feeling angry when you think about
living with diabetes? 0 12 3 4
11. Feeling constantly concerned about
food and eating? 0 12 3 4
12. Worrying about the future and the
possibility of serious complications? 0 12 3 4
13. Feelings of guilt or anxiety when you
get off track with your diabetes? 0 12 3 4
14. Not'accepting'your diabetes? 0 12 3 4
15. Feeling unsatisfied with the service
you are receiving? 0 12 3 4
16. Feeling that diabetes is taking up too
much of your mental and physical
energy every day'? 0 1 2 3 4
17. Feeling alone with your diabetes? 0 12 3 4
18. Feeling that your friends and family
are not supportive of your diabetes
management efforts? 0 12 3 4
150
Somewhat
Not a Minor Moderate serious Serious
problem problem problem problem problem
19. Coping with the complications of diabetes?.0 1
20. Feeling ' burned out' by the constant











Number, age, & gender of any children
Who lives at home
Type of diabetes (insulin or noninsulin dependent)




Time between diagnosis & treatment with insulin
(ifcurrently on insulin)
No. of daily insulin injections/tablets
Who takes responsibility for managing
your diabetes (you, your partner, someone else)?




Age when finished education
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Most recent Diabetes Clinic attendance
Date of next Diabetes Clinic Attendance
* In agreeing to participate, I also consent to my hbAlc scores being accessed from






































1= Type 1,2=Type 2
Medical
Complications
illness additional
medical
Complications
1= major complications
& functional limitations
0=no complications
Employment
Status
work employment
status
1= employed,
0=not employed
Living
Arrangement
Marital Status
live.arra
mar.stat
living
arrangements
married/
Single
1=living alone,
0=living with family
member
1=married, cohabiting
0 single/Widowed
Years in
Education
educat years in
education
In years
Insulin
Dependence
ins.dep insulin
dependence
1=lnsulin depend.,
2=noninsulin depend.
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